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Key theses
1. The low unemployment rate in the Czech Republic is an effect of a number 
of structural and political factors which have generated a certain economic 
potential. This potential was achieved when external stimuli occurred in 
the form of economic boom, which has been visible especially since 2014. 
The policy adopted by each of the Czech governments during the recent 
recession and stagnation was of great significance, alongside the support 
for the economic policy through actions taken by the National Bank of the 
Czech Republic (above all the low interest rate policy and interventions on 
the currency market). One of the reasons why the unemployment rate in the 
Czech Republic continues to be low is the relatively low labour costs and the 
high level of the country’s industrialisation where the automotive indus-
try, which heavily relies on the market situation, has an essential share. 
So-called ‘assembly plants’, i.e. industrial plants generating numerous jobs 
with low added value, also play an important role in reducing the scale of 
unemployment. A great number of such plants have been created in effect 
of investment incentives over the past twenty years (the wave reached its 
peak in 1998–2007). They were often created with the intention of reducing 
unemployment. At the same time, the Czech Republic, a developed country 
heavily reliant on exports, is extremely sensitive to changes in the economic 
situation in Europe. The Czech economy is particularly strongly influenced 
by the situation in other EU member states, which are the outlet for almost 
85% of the Czech exports. Germany is a major player in this context as it 
accounts for a third of Czech exports and a quarter of its imports, and has 
engaged its capital fairly intensively in the Czech Republic.
2. The low unemployment rate and the growing demand for labour, being an ef-
fect of the economic boom, have led to a great shortage of workers, which gives 
rise to a number of problems. In a situation where the number of vacancies 
has exceeded the number of the unemployed since spring 2018, companies 
are forced to reject some orders, and the increasing wages make it more dif-
ficult for them to remain price competitive. Furthermore, the increase in real 
wages in 2018 was much higher than the dynamics of the country’s economic 
growth and workforce productivity. It will be impossible to maintain this sit-
uation in the longer run because it makes businesses unprofitable. However, 
this increase has been stronger in the lower part of the wage pyramid, which 
above all reflects demand for less qualified workers. The increase in wages 
also stimulates inflation, and the need to make efforts to achieve the inflation 
target motivates the central bank to further raise interest rates. As a result of 
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all of these factors, it is expected that the Czech Republic’s economic growth 
will slow down from 4.4% in 2017 and almost 3% in 2018 to around 2.5% in the 
next two years. Furthermore, the administrative difficulties employers en-
counter during attempts to employ workers originating from outside the Eu-
ropean Economic Area serve only to exacerbate the problem with the shortage 
of workers. Given the fact that employees have continued to have more say on 
the Czech labour market over the past few years, the difficulties employers 
are facing are also aggravated by the Czechs’ decreasing mobility and falling 
willingness to compromise in the search for employment and due to the low 
popularity of part-time employment. 
3. The political dispute which overlaps with the talks between employer asso-
ciations and trade unions is not helping Czech firms solve their problems. 
The centre-left government led by Andrej Babiš is looking for a golden mean 
that will make it possible to find a balance on the labour market between the 
employers’ needs (and to guarantee maintaining production at least on the 
present level) and the trade unions’ appeals for increasing wages and improv-
ing the living standards. Even though Babiš’s cabinet has been making efforts 
to facilitate the employment of immigrant workers from selected countries 
(in particular, Ukraine), employers view these efforts as insufficient. Babiš 
must also take into account the opinion of his coalition partner, the Czech 
Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), which co-operates with the trade unions and 
is appealing for caution in offering workers from outside the European Union 
access to the Czech labour market, since they usually have lower demands re-
garding wages than Czechs or workers from other EU member states. The So-
cial Democrats also want to support local employees with significant rises in 
the minimum wage (the rise that was pushed through towards the end of 2018 
was the second highest in history). The ČSSD is also emphasising its concern 
for innovativeness of the Czech economy: a dramatic influx of cheap expatri-
ate workers would reduce the pressure on capital investments. Meanwhile, 
only investments of this kind can cause an increase in workforce productivity 
and wages (however, this would also cause the liquidation of some of the ex-
isting jobs). Given the lack of consensus, there is uncertainty over the future 
of the proposed amendment of one of the acts currently in parliament (it was 
put forward by the previous Babiš’s cabinet) which envisages the possibility 
of issuing so-called extraordinary annual employee visas to citizens of third 
countries in quantities adjusted to the needs of the labour market. 
4. Given the limited possibilities of recruiting employees from outside the 
EU, one solution for Czech production plants is to hire employees from EU 
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member states. At present, they account for as much as 65% of immigrant 
workers in the Czech Republic. After Slovaks, the second largest group 
are Polish workers, whose number on the Czech labour market more than 
doubled in 2014–2018 to reach around 45,000 at present. A new surprising 
phenomenon is the influx of expatriate workers from Southern Europe to 
the Czech Republic; unemployment rates there have been the highest in the 
EU over the past few years, especially among young people. The number of 
Spanish and Portuguese employees working for Czech firms has tripled over 
the past decade, and the number of Greek and Italian workers has doubled.
5. Comparisons to the German economy play an essential role in the Czech 
public debate on wages. The political left and the trade unions argue that 
local workers can have wages on a level nearer to those of their German 
counterparts with the help of regulation (including on the minimum wage), 
wage rises in the public sector and pressure on large private employers. In 
the opinion of employers, artificially raising wages is not the solution (as 
this will not work in the longer term, given the low added value of produc-
tion). They claim efforts to change the existing economic model (based on 
‘assembly plants’) need to be made towards a typical German model with 
high added value and high workforce productivity. This model in the longer 
term may succeed in generating wage rises that will not pose a risk to pro-
duction. In other words, employees are arguing that it is necessary to put an 
end to the ‘cheap economy’ before it will be possible to put an end to ‘cheap 
labour’ (something the trade unions are insisting upon). In fact this model 
change is already gradually taking place. It has been forced in part due to 
a slower increase in workforce productivity as compared to the increase in 
wages seen over the past few years. 
6. The need to increase the level of wages reduces the profitability of the for-
eign investments of the parent companies of many Czech firms (foreign 
entities control nearly 40% of Czech companies’ share capital). However, 
the parent companies already managed to capitalise on the high economic 
growth when wages were not rising so steeply, while in 2018 they reduced 
reinvestment level by a fifth to keep money flow from dividends. 2016, 2017 
and 2018 were the best years for them over the last decade, and the value 
of dividends paid abroad reached 5.3–6.1% of GDP annually. The sectors 
which have been affected most of all by the capital flight are: the telecom-
munication sector, wholesale and retail trade, and the energy sector. The 
debate over the outflow of profits has been underway in the Czech Republic 
since it joined the EU, when taxes on the transfer of dividends to parent 
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companies were lifted as part of the implementation of EU laws. Since 
2005, this has been one of the factors that caused the value of the dividends 
transferred abroad to exceed the value of foreign investments (including 
reinvestments) and to be higher than would have resulted from objective 
macroeconomic conditions. Czech politicians and economists increasingly 
often view the significant dependence on foreign companies and the re-
lated transfers of profits abroad as a problem which exposes the economy 
to the risk of shocks, and limits the possibilities of translating the results 
of GDP growth into an improvement of residents’ living standards. One of 
the measures to curb this phenomenon being considered was to impose 
taxes on certain sectors (for example, the banking sector) – this idea was 
backed by the previous prime minister, Bohuslav Sobotka. However, the 
sitting prime minister, Andrej Babiš, has rejected it for years. During the 
meeting with key investors in 2018, Babiš showed that, for the time being, 
he intends to convince rather than force them to leave a larger section of 
their profits in the Czech Republic. 
7. The economic problems and political disputes are also coupled with social 
issues linked to the situation on the labour market. Over 860,000 Czechs 
have been affected by enforcement proceedings, which makes it more dif-
ficult (and sometimes impossible) to employ them legally and ensure these 
individuals become part of the workforce in the grey economy. Given the 
desire to develop the economy with a higher added value, another problem 
is posed by the insufficient adjustment of the education system to challenges 
of the modern world and its underinvestment. In turn, the public resistance 
to the influx of foreigners and the related potential political costs will most 
likely mean that, even if the Czech government adopts regulations liberalis-
ing access to the local labour market, these will most likely be insufficient 
and passed too late from the viewpoint of the development of the Czech 
economy. The economic crisis in 2009 showed that immigrant workers 
may offer the Czech economy a ‘safety buffer’ by strengthening workforce 
resources at a time of increased demand for labour and by leaving the coun-
try when the demand significantly drops (only 30,000 of 70,000 Ukrainian 
workers remained in the Czech Republic then). Meanwhile, it is very likely 
that immigrant workers will still be needed in the Czech Republic, regard-
less of the increasing automation. As Czechs’ living standards improve, they 
are becoming increasingly unwilling to take jobs associated with low social 
prestige. A greater openness to the influx of workers from other countries 
may also be necessary due to society ageing; the Czech Republic is one of the 
countries where this process is the fastest. 
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8. In the coming years, the Czech Republic will gradually replace the economic 
model based on relatively cheap jobs with more technologically advanced 
and automated production. This will lead to an improvement in workforce 
productivity, thus enabling companies to gain funds for further pay rises, 
while reducing employment. However, this will not always be a painless 
process. In those cases where profitability turns out to be insufficient and 
increasing the added value is impossible or too expensive, this may mean 
winding up production plants and dismissing employees. However, if some 
of the companies for which the Czech Republic is becoming less cost com-
petitive move abroad, other employers will find this helpful because the 
much needed workforce will be released. These changes will put an end to 
the situation in which the low labour cost was one of the main competitive 
advantages of the Czech Republic on the international markets. However, in 
the shorter run, given the limitations (technological and cost-related) of au-
tomation and companies’ urgent needs, the best solution may be to improve 
access for employees from third countries to the Czech labour market. The 
changes in the investment incentive system promised in the government’s 
programme will most likely be introduced from 2019: withdrawing conces-
sions for companies creating low-paid jobs and instead attracting companies 
ready to create and develop modern technologies. Only when this is imple-
mented will it be known how successful Czechs are in this area. However, it 
is certain that in the present situation this country cannot afford to accept 
further investments based on the use of cheap labour on preferential terms. 
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IntroductIon
Since 2016, the Czech Republic has had the lowest unemployment rate among 
all EU member states (cf. Chart 1). In mid-2017, it overtook Japan to reach the 
top position in the ranking of OECD member states1. This situation adversely 
affects companies which are looking for ways to cope with workforce short-
ages. One solution is the automation of production processes, but employers are 
also appealing for the country to become more open to receiving immigrant 
workers, above all from Ukraine. The trade unions are opposed to this, fearing 
that an influx of workers from other countries will slow down the rate of in-
crease of wages. At the same time, there is a debate in the Czech Republic about 
the degree to which the present economic model contributes to the country 
catching up with the Western economies and what should be done to speed up 
the convergence. 
chart 1. Unemployment rate in EU member states in May 2019 (in %)
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The successes of the Czech economy seen in the past decades are to a great ex-
tent a consequence of it being strongly connected with the German economy 
and market, including its extensive openness to German companies. The Czech 
1 Cf. OECD Employment database – Unemployment indicators, www.oecd.org/employment/emp/
employmentdatabase-unemployment.htm. 
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Republic is aware of the benefits this relation offers. It is also looking for ways 
to encourage foreign owners of Czech companies to transfer abroad a smaller 
section of their profits generated in the Czech Republic. These funds might be 
allocated to increase wages for Czech employees and re-investments, in par-
ticular in projects generating high added value.
The low unemployment rate in the Czech Republic is above all a consequence 
of the economic recovery seen over the past few years. The Czech economy was 
well prepared for the recovery because in the period of recession the govern-
ment made the labour market more flexible, and the central bank reduced the 
interest rates to technical zero level2. The Czech Republic reached a higher 
than average (as compared to the EU’s mean) increase in production during the 
economic boom, also because its economy heavily relies on exports and is to 
a great extent based on the procyclical automotive sector. The low unemploy-
ment rate is also partly an effect of the economic policy adopted in 1998–2007 
when the government concentrated its efforts on creating jobs through for-
eign investments and thus reducing the negative effects of the transformation. 
As a result, mainly industrial plants generating low added value and based on 
cost competitiveness were established. 
The low unemployment rate and the ever more clearly increasing wages – 
alongside a fall in the unemployment rate – are also beneficial for the Czech 
public: living standards are improving because the rate of the wage rise is 
clearly higher than the inflation rate. This has helped the Czech Republic to 
slowly but consistently catch up with its Western neighbours over the past few 
years in terms of GDP per capita (in PPS)3. However, it is a commonly shared 
opinion that the pace of convergence is insufficient4. In the debate concerning 
the model of the country’s economic development, some argue that the Czech 
Republic is one of the first economies in the Central European region to have 
fallen into a so-called ‘middle income trap’5. 
2 According to the Czech National Bank, this is 0.05% for the main (so-called discount) inter-
est rate. In practice, it is impossible to statutorily reduce the rate below this level (the dis-
count rate is used as a reference for imposing, for example, interest on debts).
3 Cf. Charts 2 and 3.
4 Cf. e.g. the economic part of the joint report of the Czech departments of Aspen Institute and 
‘Forbes’ magazine Česko: Jak jsme na tom? (pages 14–24), published in autumn 2015, https://
s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/uploads.mangoweb.org/shared-prod/aspeninstitutece.org/
uploads/images_upload/files/Cesko%20Jak%20jsme%20na%20tom%3F.pdf. 
5 D. Klimeš, Jak probudit Česko, Brno 2017, page 36.
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The likelihood of the convergence rate slowing down will grow in the longer 
run, unless the economic model is changed to produce goods and services with 
higher added value. It could also lose momentum in the shorter run, unless 
Prague decides to open up its labour market to immigrant workers from out-
side the EU to a greater extent. At present some firms (for example, from the 
automotive industry) are already being forced to reject new orders because 
they are convinced that they will not find the employees necessary to fulfil 
these orders. Further difficulties result from the low mobility of Czechs and 
rivalry among the countries in the region for workers from third countries6. 
The gradual automation of production is a long-term solution to the situation. 
This is already observed in the Czech Republic. However, the budget for this 
purpose is paradoxically reduced by the pay rises forced by the market. 
chart 2. Changes in GDP per capita (in PPS) in the Czech Republic as compared 
to selected EU member states in 2006–2018
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6 According to Eurostat data for May 2019, three out of the four member states of the Viseg-
rad Group (Slovakia is the exception) and Germany were ranked among the seven countries 
with the lowest unemployment rates in the EU. In turn, among the twelve countries which 
form the Three Seas Initiative only two, Latvia and Croatia, had unemployment rates above 
the EU average. 
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chart 3. Changes in GDP per capita (in PPS) in the Czech Republic as compared 
to the member states of the Visegrad Group 2006–2018
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On the political level, the debate over the economic development model is cou-
pled with the dispute between the groupings which form the minority gov-
ernment led by Andrej Babiš, who originates from business circles. Babiš es-
tablished the powerful holding Agrofert, which he managed for years, while 
later he founded the political movement ANO 2011 and sympathises more with 
employers’ interests. His coalition partner, the Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD), has for years co-operated closely with the trade unions and is trying to 
rebuild its political position, pushing through the agenda of the political left, 
above all through the Ministry of Labour.
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I. The sources of low unemploymenT
The record-low level of unemployment in the Czech Republic has surprised 
many observers, especially in Western Europe. The former communist coun-
tries have for years been associated with high unemployment and structural 
problems. Meanwhile, towards the end of 2015, the unemployment rate in the 
Czech Republic fell below the rate in Germany, and the unemployment rate 
in Prague in both 2017 (1.7%) and 2018 (1.3%) was the lowest among all the EU 
regions7. This situation on the labour market is the effect of a combination of 
many factors, including the structure of the Czech economy that had been 
formed for many decades and the economic policy of recent years. 
1. preparation for an external stimulus and the central bank’s 
support 
The low unemployment rate in the Czech Republic is not a phenomenon 
typical of the past few years. From the beginning of the transformation, the 
Czech Republic stood out in this area when compared to the entire region. It also 
performed better than Slovakia, which was one of the sources of tension inside 
the common state8. The registered unemployment rate in the Czech Republic 
stabilised in a relatively short time at a level of around 3%9. It remained at this 
level until the crisis in 1997–1999. This phenomenon was accompanied by a re-
strictive budgetary and monetary policy, which also caused an increase in the 
number of unemployed people. Even then (and even more so later), the unem-
ployment rate did not exceed 9% in the worst year (according to Eurostat). This 
is viewed as an effect of the relatively good structure of the Czech workforce’s 
qualifications just before the transformation, the high level of education, its 
7 According to Eurostat data, the unemployment rate in all eight Czech regions (according to 
NUTS 2) failed to reach even 5% in 2017, and 4% in 2018 (the highest rate, 4.7% in 2017 and 
3.7% in 2018, was in the Moravian-Silesian Region neighbouring Poland). 
8 After unemployment was maintained artificially at zero in the socialist period, in 1990 it 
rose to 0.7% in the Czech Republic and 1.5% in Slovakia. One year later, the unemployment 
rate was four times higher in the Czech Republic (4.1%) and eleven times higher in Slovakia 
(11.7%). In Slovakia, despite a decrease in the next year (to 10.4%), the unemployment rate 
has continuously remained above 10%. It fell below this level for a short time only in 2008 
(9.6%), and for longer in 2016. Cf. L. Černohorská, ‘Komparace vývoje nezaměstnanosti v České 
republice a na Slovensku’, Scientific Papers of the University of Pardubice, Series D, Faculty of Eco-
nomics and Administration, no. 10/2006 and ‘Unemployment rate – annual data’, Eurostat, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tip
sun20&language=en.
9 According to Eurostat’s methodology (in the Czech Republic it is referred to as Výběrové 
šetření pracovních sil – VŠPS) around 4%.
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geographical location close to Germany and Austria, the effective operation of 
the trilateral commission10 and the relatively low percentage of the workforce 
employed in the agricultural sector. The relatively poorly developed services 
and trade sector was able to absorb a significant section of workers who lost 
their jobs in other sectors11. Another factor which had an impact was the re-
duction of the supply of labour as many elderly people retired and a higher per-
centage of women remained at home after giving birth to a child; the extension 
of maternity leave from two to three years contributed to this. Although this 
contrasted with the high economic activity of elderly people and women in the 
socialist period, the employment rate in the 1990s still remained above 65% (at 
present it is around 75%). 
An essential role was also played by the economic and monetary policy adopted 
by the first right-wing governments and the central bank which supported the 
stability of the Czech currency, creating good conditions for economic develop-
ment. In effect, the Czech Republic was one of the few countries in the region 
that managed to avoid hyperinflation12.
Over the past decade or so, especially in the period of the most recent recession 
and stagnation, the policy adopted by subsequent governments prepared the 
Czech economy well for an external stimulus for revival, and this had a strong 
impact on reducing unemployment. In 2011, the parliament passed solutions 
that made the labour code more flexible, thus fulfilling the manifesto promise 
of the centre-right government led by Petr Nečas. Starting from 2012, the limit 
of hours for specific task contracts was increased, and the minimum wage was 
frozen between 2007 and 201213, which helped slow down the general increase 
in wages and strengthened the price competitiveness of Czech firms. The next 
governments took care of the good condition of the state’s finances and did not 
neglect the social sphere; the indicator of people at risk of poverty or social 
10 The joint body of representatives of the government, organisations of employers and trade 
unions in the Czech Republic is formally called the Council of Economic and Social Agree-
ment. 
11 Cf. L. Žídek, Transformace české ekonomiky: 1989–2004, Prague 2006, page 124.
12 As compared to 1989, the prices in the Czech Republic increased by 230% in 1993 and by 300% 
in 1996. At the same time, prices in Poland increased by 2,260% and 4,580%, respectively. 
Cf. Ibid., page 130.
13 In 2007–2012 it was equivalent to around 310 euro, and in the following two years to around 
330 euro, being one of the lowest in the EU. For comparison, the minimum wage in Poland 
in 2012 was around 350 euro and in the following two years it was 375 and nearly 400 euro, 
respectively. 
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exclusion was then (and still is) one of the lowest in the EU14. Even though most 
of these moves had been carried out by the Nečas government (2010–2013), in 
many aspects its policy was continued by the centre-left cabinets led by Jiří 
Rusnok (2013–2014) and Bohuslav Sobotka (2014–2017). 
Actions taken by the Czech National Bank (CNB) to support the Czech govern-
ment – above all the policy of low interest rates and interventions on the cur-
rency market – also contributed to the economic revival and, as a consequence, 
a reduction of the unemployment level. This is something that marks a clear 
difference between the Czech Republic and its neighbour, Slovakia (Bratislava 
is unable to adopt an independent monetary policy because Slovakia is a mem-
ber of the eurozone). In the Czech Republic active measures in this area were 
taken by Miroslav Singer, an independent candidate nominated by President 
Václav Klaus from the right-wing party ODS, who was the governor of the CNB 
in 2010–2016. Given the economic crisis and the risk of the emergence of a dan-
gerous deflationary spiral, the CNB reduced interest rates already towards 
the end of 2012 to the so-called ‘technical zero’ level (0.05%) and undertook to 
maintain them at this level as long as necessary. Since the effects of this move 
were limited and the prices of many products (including energy) had fallen, 
the CNB decided in November 2013 to launch regular interventions, promising 
that it will not allow the Czech koruna to euro exchange rate to rise above 27 
CZK/EUR. This policy was also continued for almost a year by Singer’s succes-
sor as the governor of the central bank, Jiří Rusnok, who was nominated by 
President Miloš Zeman, a former Social Democrat.
Even though the main goal of the CNB is to maintain stable prices (manifested 
in the inflation target), its actions in this case were beneficial also from the 
point of view of the economic policy. They were intended above all to support 
exporters, and employees of these firms and individuals who found jobs ow-
ing to their growth also benefited. This move was also beneficial for compa-
nies operating on the domestic market because a relative increase in prices 
of imported goods revived the demand for local products, and thus helped to 
14 In 2009–2018, the share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion ranged between 12.2% and 
15.4%, this was almost each time the lowest in the EU (except for 2012, when the Netherlands had 
a lower rate). Cf. ‘People at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, Eurostat, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_50&language=en.
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limit unemployment15. However, critics believed16 that the moves of the CNB 
discouraged exporters from improving productivity because they did not have 
to make investments and were entrenching the model of competing primar-
ily on price. Once inflation reached the desired level towards the end of 2016 
(low unemployment provoked the pressure on pay rises and thus an increase 
in prices), the CNB in April 2017 withdrew from the undertaking to protect the 
koruna/euro exchange rate and began increasing the interest rates starting 
from August 2017. 
2. low labour costs, automotive industry and ‘assembly plants’ 
One reason for the low unemployment level in the Czech Republic is the still 
relatively low cost of labour. Eurostat data for 2018 show that the average 
working hour in the Czech Republic cost 12.6 euros; this is the tenth low-
est result in the EU and accounts for only 53% of the EU average17. Although 
it is much higher than, for example, in Bulgaria (5.4 euros) or Romania (6.7 
euros), and is at a similar level as in the other V4 countries (from 9.2 euros 
to 11.6 euros), it is still very far behind the neighbouring economic powers: 
Germany (34.6 euros) and Austria (34 euros); see Chart 4. At the same time, 
unemployed people do not have much of an alternative, given the fact that 
unemployment benefits in the Czech Republic are among the lowest in the 
OECD (25% of wage at previous job)18.
15 According to the CNB, if it had not undertaken to protect the exchange rate, the econom-
ic growth in 2014 alone would have been 1 percentage point lower. Cf. ‘Co byl kurzový 
závazek?’, CNB, https://www.cnb.cz/cs/casto-kladene-dotazy/Co-byl-kurzovy-zavazek/.
16 Cf. H. Horská, ‘Rok od konce intervencí ČNB: Oslabení koruny pomohlo zombie firmám, 
které brzdí ekonomiku, říká Horská’, Reflex, 13 April 2018, https://www.reflex.cz/clanek/
komentare/86405/rok-od-konce-intervenci-cnb-oslabeni-koruny-pomohlo-zombie-firmam-
ktere-brzdi-ekonomiku-rika-horska.html.
17 The Czech Republic was rated second in the EU in 2017–2018 as regards the rate of hourly la-
bour price growth (11.2%; after Latvia which took the first position, and level with Romania). 
Eurostat, ‘Hourly labour costs’, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/in-
dex.php/Hourly_labour_costs.
18 Cf. OECD Employment Outlook 2018. Data for 2015. Lower values were seen only in the case of 
Hungary and the USA. In the case of Poland this indicator is 41%, i.e. lower than the OECD 
average of 53%.
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chart 4. Labour costs in EU member states in 2018 
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The record-low unemployment rate is partly a consequence of the high indus-
trialisation of the country. The automotive industry, which is heavily dependent 
on the market situation, plays an especially important role here. The share of 
industry in the added value in the Czech Republic is the highest among all Euro-
pean countries – In 2018 it was 32.7% of GDP19, and almost 40% of all Czech em-
ployees work in the so-called ‘secondary sector’20. The automotive industry alone 
accounts for over 20% of industrial production and a similar share of export 
value21. It is worth noting that the Czech Republic is a power not only in terms 
of car manufacturing (with the second largest – after Slovakia – number of cars 
manufactured per capita22) but also in terms of manufacturing buses (the world’s 
largest manufacturer per capita) and components for the automotive industry. 
This is a legacy of the industrial traditions dating back to the Austro-Hungarian 
times and the development of the automotive industry in inter-war Czechoslo-
vakia. The entire school system was formatted then in order to prepare human 
19 These data also include the construction sector. Slovakia is rated second in the EU (31.3%); 
in Poland this indicator is 29.6%. Cf. Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP), 
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS. 
20 I. Dušková, Práce není všude stejně, The Czech Statistical Office, www.statistikaamy.cz/2016/09/
prace-neni-vsude-stejne/.
21 Cf. CzechInvest, Automobilový průmysl, https://www.czechinvest.org/cz/Sluzby-pro-inves-
tory/Klicove-sektory/Automobilovy-prumysl. 
22 A new car is made in the Czech Republic every 20 seconds on average. 
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resources for the new branch of industry, in which Škoda was also engaged. The 
successful privatisation of Škoda Auto factories in the early 1990s was also im-
portant for the development of the automotive industry in the Czech Republic. 
Numerous subcontractor factories developed around the company (which be-
longs to the Volkswagen Group) and the availability of the production base (also 
in neighbouring countries) and human resources helped attract further global 
car brands. The largest ones include Toyota and PSA, which in 2005 launched 
production of small cars as part of a joint venture in Kolín (Central Bohemi-
an Region), and Hyundai (which in 2008 opened a factory in Nošovice in the 
Moravian-Silesian Region). This reliance on a sector which is very sensitive to 
changes in the market situation has had negative consequences for the Czech 
Republic. However, at present, the local factories, especially those of Škoda Auto, 
have a guarantee of orders for new models even a few months before produc-
tion. Therefore, when the economies of the largest EU member states (especially 
Germany) are developing, the development potential of the Czech automotive 
industry grows even faster – to the extent that the demand created cannot be 
satisfied by the local labour market. 
So-called ‘assembly plants’ play a great role in curbing unemployment. These 
are industrial plants that generate numerous jobs with low added value. A great 
number of these have been established over the past twenty years as a conse-
quence of investment incentives23. The greatest number of these plants were es-
tablished in 1998–2007, when the country was being governed mostly by Social 
Democratic cabinets. This was the period (until 2007) when a return of even 65% 
of the investment value could be achieved. The preceding right-wing govern-
ments led by Václav Klaus preferred Czech capital control over local companies, 
which was possible owing to loans granted on preferential terms by banks which 
were partly controlled by the state. Problems linked to these loans were among 
the reasons why the next governments chose development through the entry of 
foreign investors to the Czech economy on a massive scale. 
Assembly plants are relatively easy to create but also to move to another loca-
tion24. They strongly engage human capital, often individuals with low educa-
23 According to UN data, in 1990–2010 the Czech Republic attracted triple the value of in-
vestments than could have been expected, given the significance of the Czech economy. 
Cf. ‘Z Česka loni odteklo 280 miliard. Babiš si firmy pozval, chce je přemluvit po dobrém’, 
Aktuálně.cz, 13 September 2018, https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/ekonomika/dividendy-firem-
z-ceska-dosahuji-stamiliard-firmy-se-radi-s/r~17a8fa8eb73811e89271ac1f6b220ee8/.
24 One example may be two American companies moving production to Romania in order to 
cut wage expenses: Delphi Packard Electric ended manufacturing cables in Česká Lípa in 
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tion levels and this is expected to make the projects more cost competitive. 
However, this generates low profits for Czech entities, regardless of the value 
of the goods. This is illustrated, for example, by data which demonstrate that 
the share of the domestic added value in Czech exports is 62.3%, which is one 
of the lowest of the 34 OECD countries researched25. Very few companies in the 
Czech Republic maintain a full value added chain26 from the product devel-
opment stage through production up to sale to the end user. These companies 
include Škoda Auto, Škoda Transportation (a rolling stock manufacturer), ČGS 
Holding (a tyre manufacturer) and Doosan Škoda Power (which manufactures 
e.g. steam turbines). Maintaining those sections of the chain which generate 
the highest added value (these include final sale and research and develop-
ment, R&D) has a key impact on the size of a company’s profit, while simple 
industrial assembly or logistics generate lower added value. 
Škoda Auto is the leader of research and development in the Czech Republic. In 
2017, it allocated the equivalent of almost 600 million euros (the value was 50% 
higher y/y) for this purpose, which is equivalent to half of the profits generated 
by the company and is only half as much as direct support for R&D from the 
Czech budget that year27. The fact that firms, including foreign investors, do 
2011, and TRW Volant wound up the production of car steering wheels in Horní Počernice 
two years later. Similar practices can be seen in other sectors: in 2015, the US company Mon-
delez moved part of the production of Opavia sweets to Poland. Relocations within the Czech 
Republic also happen: the Canadian manufacturer of plastic car components, Magna Exte-
riors, in 2016 transferred a part of its factory from Liberec closer to the headquarters of its 
main customer, Škoda Auto (Mladá Boleslav). 
25 Similar results (55–56%) have been achieved by the economies of Slovakia and Hungary. Po-
land’s result is 73.1%. Cf. Domestic value added in gross exports, OECD, 2019, https://data.oecd.
org/trade/domestic-value-added-in-gross-exports.htm. 
26 The value added chain is a sequence of strategically significant activities carried out by 
a company to increase the value of a product or service in the eyes of its clients. The man-
ner in which these activities are implemented determines the costs and affects the size of 
the profits generated. Therefore, this approach helps the company understand the sources 
of competitive advantage. The aim is to achieve it through quicker and/or cheaper supply of 
the product or service. This concept was devised by the US economist Michael Porter in the 
1980s. On the other hand, firms rarely control the entire supply chain which is an element 
of the value chain. In the case of Škoda Auto, for example, as much as 40% of component sup-
pliers are German companies; the Czech companies account for around a fifth of the total. 
Cf. R. Hogg, ‘Skoda: Simply Clever logistics’, Automotive Logistics, 6 July 2015, https://auto-
motivelogistics.media/intelligence/skoda-simply-clever-logistics.
27 ‘Výroční zpráva za rok 2017’, Škoda Auto, 2018, https://cdn.skoda-storyboard.com/2018/03/
skoda-annual-report-2017.c5a29f2a9b556d42158ef72031b710f3.pdf and ‘Stát vydal v roce 
2017 na výzkum a vývoj přes 30 miliard korun’, VědaVýzkum.cz, 10 December 2018, https://
vedavyzkum.cz/politika-vyzkumu-a-vyvoje/politika-vyzkumu-a-vyvoje/stat-vydal-v-roce-
2017-na-vyzkum-a-vyvoj-pres-30-miliard-korun. 
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not develop innovations on a larger scale is an effect of the system of attracting 
foreign investments in which the conditions of access to the Czech Republic 
are agreed, while the conditions of the further development of the investments 
are not taken into consideration. Another important factor is the relatively low 
value of tax incentives that might stimulate companies to develop innovation28.
3. capitalising on the economic boom and the proximity 
of (and dependence on) Germany 
The Czech Republic as a so-called ‘small open economy’ is one of those devel-
oped countries which rely on exports to the highest degree29. Its trade balance 
has regularly been positive (reaching over 15 billion euros in 2018); the only EU 
member states to have developed a positive balance in 2018 in trade relations 
with the Czech Republic were Poland, Ireland, and Malta. However, this makes 
the Czech Republic dependent on the economic situation in the countries to 
which its exports go. The first three are its neighbours from the EU (Germany, 
Slovakia and Poland), and in 2018 EU member states accounted for as much as 
84.1% of its exports30. The key markets outside Europe are the United States 
and Russia, which account for 2% of Czech exports each. 
The Czech Republic capitalises on its geographic proximity and its economic 
bonds with Germany. In absolute values, Czech exports to this country in-
creased by 270% in 2004–2017 and by 160% since 2010 (in the case of imports 
the increase was 210% and 150%, respectively). Thus Germany accounts for 
a third of Czech exports (almost a third of this goes to neighbouring Bavaria; 
one fifth concerns the automotive sector31) and a quarter of imports, and this 
28 According to the OECD’s estimates, its value is 0.05% of GDP, while this indicator is 0.17% 
of GDP in the case of the Netherlands, 0.15% in the case of Austria, and 0.09% in the case of 
Hungary. In turn, the Czech Republic has a better indicator than, for example, Poland or Slo-
vakia. Cf. ‘Measuring Tax Support for R&D and Innovation’, OECD, March 2019, http://www.
oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm. 
29 In 2016, it was ranked sixth, with the share of exports in GDP at the level of 80% (Poland 52%, 
OECD average 28%), and since then this share has grown to over 83%. Cf. ‘Trade in goods and 
services’, OECD, 2019, data.oecd.org/trade/trade-in-goods-and-services.htm. 
30 Data from the Czech Statistical Office (Foreign Trade Database http://apl.czso.cz/pll/stazo/STA-
ZO.STAZO). For comparison, the share of Polish exports to the EU at the same time was 80.1%. 
31 In 2017, the Czech Republic outpaced Spain and became the main supplier of components to 
automotive corporations active in Germany. At the same time, Škoda has been the most fre-
quently imported car make to Germany for a few years, and the Czech company has a 9% 
share in the German new car market. Cf. M. Bičík, ‘Německo je pro český export klíčovým 
trhem’, Hospodářské noviny, 28 August 2018, https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-66226250-nemecko-
je-pro-cesky-export-klicovym-trhem.
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share has remained on a similar level for a decade32. At the same time, Ger-
many itself is a strongly export-oriented country, and part of the goods im-
ported from the Czech Republic are re-exported (according to estimates, Czech 
exports to China via Germany are higher than direct exports)33. Transactions 
are often effected within one group which controls a Czech company. The value 
of cumulative investments towards the end of 2017 reached around 20 billion 
euros, which accounted for as much as 16.4% of total investments and made 
Germany the second largest investor in the Czech Republic (after the Nether-
lands) and the most important one in terms of the significance of investments 
for the Czech economy34. German companies also dominated the ranking of in-
vestments made only in the past few years (2014–2017), with their share reach-
ing as much as 45%. The low unemployment rate in Germany itself (3.2% in 
April 2019) – which translates into an increase in labour costs – contributes 
to German companies making more intensive use of subcontractors in such 
countries as the Czech Republic. The opinion can be heard in the Czech Repub-
lic that parent companies (not only German ones) may be engaged in maintain-
ing the relatively low prices of their Czech subsidiaries on purpose in order 
to maintain higher profitability of projects being implemented by the central 
office35. Due to interference with the natural market mechanism, an imbal-
ance has occurred. One of its consequences is the low unemployment rate seen 
in the Czech Republic. In the standard economic scenario, an increase in de-
mand should trigger an increase in prices. In turn, this phenomenon would 
have restricted sales growth, and thus the need to significantly raise employ-
ment levels would not have occurred. However, it needs to be noted that firms 
owned by foreign capital do in fact pay an average of double the wage that can 
be expected from a company controlled by Czech capital. Workforce productiv-
ity is also twice as high at these firms, which in turn is linked to the fact that 
foreign investors tend to choose the sectors which are characterised by higher 
workforce productivity in general36.
32 For comparison, Germany accounts for 28.1% of Poland’s exports and 22.4% of its imports.
33 Cf. ‘Studie: závislost české ekonomiky na Německu zesiluje’, 24 August 2016, https://www.
euro.cz/byznys/studie-zavislost-ceske-ekonomiky-na-nemecku-zesiluje-1301802.
34 Data of the Czech National Bank, www.cnb.cz/analytics/saw.dll?Portal&PortalPath=/
shared/PZI_WEB/WEB_PZI.
35 This has been claimed, for example, by Dušan Tříska from the Prague University of Econom-
ics who served as a deputy minister of finance in the early 1990s. 
36 D. Busta, ‘Zahraniční firmy vyplácí vyšší mzdy než domácí. Porovnání ukazuje, kolik platí 
a kolik by platit měly’, Hospodářské noviny, 10 September 2018, https://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-
66238550-zahranicni-firmy-plati-i-nekolikanasobne-vyssi-mzdy-nez-domaci-unikatni-
srovnani-porovnava-vice-nez-stovku-odvetvi.
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II. The openInG up of The labour markeT – 
The dIfferenT sTances of Trade unIons 
and employers 
The centre-left government led by Andrej Babiš has been looking for a golden 
mean in the labour market policy that will make it possible to balance employ-
ers’ needs (and guarantee maintaining production at least at the present level) 
and trade unions’ demands to increase wages and improve living standards. 
The issue of opening up the Czech labour market to immigrant workers from 
outside the EU is given a great deal of attention in this debate. In the opinion 
of trade union representatives (including the largest trade union confedera-
tion, ČMKOS) and the government coalition partner, the Czech Social Dem-
ocratic Party, which co-operates with the trade unions, caution is needed in 
such moves37. They do not want the opening up of the labour market to slow 
down the growth of real wages. They also raise the issue of care for the innova-
tiveness of the Czech economy since a large influx of foreign cheap workforce 
would reduce the pressure on capital investment and thus an increase in work-
force productivity and the level of wages. 
Strong counter-arguments in this discussion are presented by the Chamber of 
Commerce38, which draws attention to the fact that there are almost 350,000 
job vacancies on the Czech labour market (cf. Chart 5). It has been impos-
sible to find domestic employees willing to take these jobs because for many 
months unemployed Czechs (whose number is not big anyway) either are not 
interested in them or do not have adequate qualifications39. The vacancies are 
mainly jobs for an unqualified workforce or for professionals without higher 
education40. Labour shortage is the biggest problem for the key exporters: the 
37 The Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (Českomoravská konfederace odborových 
svazů). It is a confederation of 29 trade unions (16 in the private sector and 13 in the public 
sector) which in total have around 300,000 members. 
38 The largest association of employers operating in the Czech Republic has 15,000 members 
(including over 60% of the top hundred largest Czech firms) grouped in 62 regional and 113 
sectoral chambers.
39 ‘Kvůli rekordnímu počtu neobsazených pracovních míst dojde letos k obrovským škodám 
v české ekonomice’, Hospodářská komora České republiky, 10 May 2018, https://www.ko-
mora.cz/tiskova_zprava/kvuli-rekordnimu-poctu-neobsazenych-pracovnich-mist-dojde-
letos-k-obrovskym-skodam-v-ceske-ekonomice/.
40 These include plumbers, carpenters, bakers, painters and machine operators. In the list of 
vacancies for the first quarter of 2018, 30% are jobs for ‘assistant and unqualified’ workers, 
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automotive (66%) and the machine-building (59%) industries41. In the opinion 
of the chamber, the high demand for labour – combined with the unwilling-
ness to take jobs by individuals registered in the job centres – brings about 
the need to hire immigrant workers. With the exception of hiring employees 
from the European Economic Area, Czech regulations concerning employ-
ment of foreigners are very complicated, and recruitment takes a long time. 
The problem of the large shortage of workers in the Czech Republic is not only 
about restrictions in hiring expatriate workers from outside the EU, although 
this issue is important in this context. The employers’ problems are partly a re-
sult of Czechs’ low mobility (which is decreasing, given the low unemployment 
level) and the low popularity of part-time employment (which could help acti-
vate elderly people or facilitate young mothers to return to the labour market). 
Over 860,000 Czechs have been affected by enforcement proceedings, which 
makes it more difficult (and sometimes impossible) to employ them legally and 
causes that these individuals become part of the human resources of the grey 
economy42. Given the desire to create an economy with higher added value, an-
other problem is the insufficient adjustment of the education system to modern 
challenges and its underinvestment43. These issues have been raised further in 
this report. 
over 35% for machine and equipment operators and assembly workers, and less than 20% 
for craftsmen and mechanics. 
41 K. Zábojníková, ‘Nedostatek lidí dělá podnikům problemy’, Statistika&My, no. 7–8/2018, 
http://www.statistikaamy.cz/2018/07/nedostatek-lidi-dela-podnikum-problemy/.
42 Cf. Mapa exekucí, Otevřená společnost, http://mapaexekuci.cz/index.php/mapa-2/.
43 As regards public spending on education as a share of GDP, the Czech Republic is ranked last 
but one among the OECD countries (around 3.2%; in Poland this is above 4%), and elementary 
school teachers’ wages as compared to wages of other employees with higher education are 
the lowest in the OECD (56%; in Poland over 80%). As a consequence, being a teacher is not 
an appealing profession; there are only 1.5 willing candidates per place at university peda-
gogical departments, and around one half of graduates from these departments choose a dif-
ferent profession to be able to make a living. The average age among teachers is growing fast. 
What makes the situation even worse is the fact that school principals are nominated by lo-
cal governments, and it often happens that the main criterion for the nominations are their 
political or personal connections. Another characteristic of the Czech Republic is the sig-
nificant regional differences (larger than on average in the EU) in the level of residents’ ed-
ucation (individuals aged 25–64 with higher education): from less than 15% in Ústecký and 
Karlovy Vary Regions to over 45% in Prague; in Poland this ranges from 24% in the Lubusz 
Voivodeship to 41% in the Mazovian Voivodeship) and in examination results: the worst re-
sults have been seen for a long time in Ústecký and Karlovy Vary Regions, while the best ones 
are in Prague, the Vysočina, Brno and Zlín Regions. Furthermore, the chance of receiving 
higher education is strongly correlated to one’s parents’ education level: only 3% of children 
who do not have educated parents go to universities. However, exceptions to these rules 
need also to be noticed: the second largest Czech city, Brno, earned the status of the Czech 
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1. a long way to employment in the czech republic
To receive a job in the Czech Republic, a third country national must first be 
granted residence and employment permits44. The most frequent document 
proving the presence of both permits is the so-called ‘dual employee card’ 
which is granted for a specific job and employer (it is possible to change the job 
or the employer only upon consent from the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and 
for the term of the employment (which may not be longer than for two years, 
though there is an option to renew it)45. The employer must first report a vacan-
cy to a regional job centre, and in case no Czech employee is found for the job in 
30 days, it is recorded (upon employer’s consent) in the base of jobs for foreign-
ers. It is only then that a firm may commence recruitment among foreigners. 
The long period of waiting for the employee card (usually over six months, and 
sometimes even a year) makes three-month employee visas more popular; over 
45,000 of these visas were issued in 2017 alone46. The need to renew the visas 
is one of the reasons for the frequently seen queues on the Slovak-Ukrainian 
border, because Ukrainian citizens are usually hired on short-term visas47.
Another alternative for employee cards is to delegate a third country national 
with an employment permit from another EU member states where the pro-
cedures take less time, for example, Poland, where – as representatives of the 
Chamber of Commerce emphasise48 – it is possible to obtain a work permit for 
a foreigner in a few weeks. Cases of abusing the delegation mechanism by so-
called ‘fly-by-night companies’, especially from Poland (and which are some-
times run by Ukrainians), have been publicised on numerous occasions in the 
Czech Republic. The case that received the greatest amount of publicity was 
the detention of 85 Ukrainians working for the online store Rohlik.cz who 
were delegated from a Polish company (which paid social security contribu-
tions for them) in spring 2017. The problem lay firstly in the fact that the Polish 
firm was not strictly speaking an employment agency. Furthermore, it entered 
IT centre owing to investments, and the Czech Technical University in Prague (ČVUT) cre-
ated a high-quality education programme concerning the development of smart cities.
44 Exceptions include foreigners who are family members of EU citizens, and asylum seekers. 
45 In special cases, the so-called ‘non-dual’ employee card is issued, for example when a for-
eigner graduated from a secondary school or university in the Czech Republic.
46 D. Klimeš, ‘Česko nezvládá přijímat prácechtivé Ukrajince. Ti pendlují na krátkodobá víza 
nebo fingovaně pracují přes Polsko’, Ekonom, 23 August 2018, https://m.ihned.cz/ekonom/
c1-66222860-cesko-nezvlada-prijimat-pracechtive-ukrajince.
47 Cf. Chart 8.
48 D. Klimeš, ‘Česko…’, op. cit.
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into a specific task contract with Rohlik.cz as part of cross-border provision 
of services, while in fact it did not provide any services to the Czech firm but 
rather offered workers to it49. The owner of the Czech firm claimed that he had 
resorted to a practice that was commonly used in the Czech Republic, and rep-
resentatives of Czech labour agencies estimate that ‘thousands’ of foreigners 
from third countries are getting access to the Czech labour market via Poland50.
2. The government’s (overly) scant gestures towards employers 
One step to meet the employers’ needs halfway is the governmental initia-
tive ‘Režim Ukrajina’ that has been in place since August 2016. This facilitated 
Czech firms to employ 13,300 Ukrainian specialists in two years on the ba-
sis of employee cards received according to a simplified procedure51. However, 
the Chamber of Commerce which administers the programme has noticed 
a visible increase in interest, reaching as many as 2,000 enquiries about new 
49 Cf. R. Bohuslavová, ‘Zmatek na ministerstvech. Kauza rohlik.cz upozornila na mezeru 
v zákoně’, Echo24.cz, 14 March 2017, https://echo24.cz/a/w3HKL/zmatek-na-ministerst-
vech-kauza-rohlikcz-upozornila-na-mezeru-v-zakone, R. Burkovič, ‘Asociace pracovních 
agentur (APA) má velké výhrady k návrhu novely Zákoníku práce a Zákona o inspekci práce, 
zároveň v ní opět postrádá postih firem, objednávajících opakovaně nelegální práci’, APA, 
13 September 2018, http://www.apa.cz/tiskove_zpravy.htm and ‘Na co se nás ptáte v případu 
polských víz’, Blog.Rohlik.cz, 14 March 2017, https://blog.rohlik.cz/2017/03/14/na-co-se-nas-
ptate-v-pripadu-polskych-viz/.
50 Cf. ‘Ukrajinci proudí z Polska. Na tamní vízum čekají týden, na české i půl roku’, Lidovky.cz, 20 March 
2017, lidovky.cz/ukrajinci-proudi-z-polska-09n-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A170319_214708_ln_
domov_pev and ‘Jako Rohlik.cz fungují tisíce firem, máme teď starosti vůbec dovézt banány, 
naříká Čupr’, Aktuálně.cz, 13 March 2017, https://video.aktualne.cz/dvtv/jako-rohlikcz-fun-
guji-tisice-firem-mame-ted-starosti-vubec/r~acb40cbc080d11e7bb37002590604f2e/.
51 When choosing this type of employment, it is necessary to comply with the following proce-
dures: first a Czech company is registered by the Chamber of Commerce in the programme 
base (it must meet certain requirements, for example, at least two years of operation). Va-
cancies meeting certain conditions are also registered (they must first be registered in the 
nationwide base and no Czech citizens may be interested in these jobs). A firm has the obli-
gation to find Ukrainians willing to take the jobs and offer a contract for at least a year (the 
firm must pay an equivalent of around 100 euros for registration in the programme, and the 
cost of reporting each employee is around 8 euros). Unlike with the standard procedure, can-
didates for employees do not have to individually arrange a visit at the consulate and wait 
for their turn. The consulate contacts the company, setting the date for filing the application 
for the employee card – the firm is obliged to forward this information to its prospective em-
ployee from Ukraine who has to go to the visa centre in Lviv (at present, this service is pro-
vided by an external company which forwards the applications to the consulate) and to pay 
a charge of 20 euros. The real period from the firm’s application acceptance by the Chamber 
of Commerce to setting the time as referred to above is around 87 days, according to the most 
recent data. The offices must consider the application within 60 days of its being submitted.
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employees monthly52. The programme’s success caused similar procedures to 
be extended to citizens of Mongolia and the Philippines (in April 2018), Serbia 
(in August 2018), and India (in September 2018). However, the annual limits as 
part of the simplified procedures for citizens of these countries are low (1,000 
each for Mongolia and the Philippines, 2,000 for Serbia, and 500 for India), and 
even increasing the limit for Ukrainians at the beginning of 2018 (by 10,000 to 
a level of 19,600)53 did not resolve the problem with the labour shortage. There-
fore, the employers had strong arguments during talks with the government 
on raising the limits and secured the promise of a serious lifting of the limit for 
Ukrainians in the second half of 2019 (to 40,000) and introducing simplified 
procedures for workers from other countries (this time from Belarus, Monte-
negro and Moldova – 1,000 each)54. 
The results of a questionnaire conducted among employers participating in 
‘Režim Ukrajina’ reveal the key problems linked to such initiatives. 88% of 
them complain about the length of the process (it takes usually a few months 
to receive the employee card)55. 39% of employers emphasise the inconven-
ience posed by the administrative burdens or point to problems with hired 
workers (73% mentioned an insufficient command of the Czech language, and 
13% mentioned ‘a different mentality’56). To deal with the administrative dif-
ficulties, towards the end of 2018 the chamber opened its offices in Lviv and 
Belgrade to hope to cope with the bureaucracy in situ and to provide advice on 
52 Ibid. and ‘Ukrajinští pracovníci jsou přínosem nejen pro zaměstnavatele, ale i společnost. 
Přispívají na české důchody i zdravotní péči. Hospodářská komora bude vyjednávat s vládou 
o zdvojnásobení ročních kvót’, Hospodářská komora České republiky, 30 July 2018, https://
www.komora.cz/tiskova_zprava/ukrajinsti-pracovnici-jsou-prinosem-nejen-pro-zamest-
navatele-ale-i-spolecnost-prispivaji-na-ceske-duchody-i-zdravotni-peci-hospodarska-ko-
mora-bude-vyjednavat-s-vladou-o-zdvojnasobeni-rocnich-kvot/.
53 Regardless of this limit, a separate ‘Režim zemědělec’ has applied in the Czech Republic since 
August 2017 as part of which an additional 1,500 Ukrainians annually can be employed, how-
ever only in the agricultural sector. 
54 ‘Tuzemský trh práce se bez zahraničních pracovníků neobejde’, SP ČR, 10 January 2019, 
www.spcr.cz/pro-media/tiskove-zpravy/12507-tuzemsky-trh-prace-se-bez-zahranic-
nich-pracovniku-neobejde.
55 The Chamber of Commerce must close all the procedures within 90 days. For comparison: 
it takes around a week from the date of submitting the application to receive a three-month 
employee visa that functions in line with Schengen Area principles. Applying for both doc-
uments, sometimes also to other countries, is a frequent practice. As the Chamber of Com-
merce claims, some Ukrainians choose employment in Poland or Russia in the meantime 
due to the long period of waiting for Czech employee cards.
56 ‘Bilanční TK ke dvěma letům od spuštění vládního Režimu Ukrajina’, HK ČR, 30.07.2018, https://
www.komora.cz/files/uploads/2018/07/20180730_PODKLADY_Režim-Ukrajina_GRAFY.pdf.
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issues linked to employing immigrant workers from the countries where the 
offices are located57.
3. aliens are unwelcome in the czech republic
One of the reasons why politicians are cautious about opening up the labour 
market is the dislike the Czech public has for foreigners. This has been manifest-
ed in public opinion polls for many years, the migration crisis being not the only 
cause. According to a poll conducted in March 2019, 53% of Czechs view ‘newly 
arrived citizens of other national backgrounds’ as a problem. However, this is 
still a better result than in autumn 2015, when the migration crisis reached its 
peak (69%)58. According to the same poll, most Czechs are convinced that for-
eigners who have lived in their country for a long time pose the risk of spreading 
diseases (64%) and are a reason for increasing crime rates (61%); see Chart 5. Con-
trary to the facts, as many as 40% of Czechs (and this share is the smallest over 
the decade) believe that foreigners are a reason for growing unemployment, and 
32% are of the opinion that they do not contribute to economic development. As 
many as 41% of the respondents claimed that employing foreigners in the Czech 
Republic in general was not ‘proper’59. The perception of foreigners depends on 
their country of origin: the nations viewed best in the Czech Republic are Slovaks 
(83% view them as likeable and 3% are of the opposite opinion), Poles (45% vs. 
17%, respectively), Greeks (40% vs. 13%) and Hungarians (38% vs. 14%)60. Among 
the numerous nations present in the Czech Republic, negative opinions prevail 
with regard to Russians, Ukrainians, Serbs and Romanians; and the nations who 
are perceived worst are Arabs and Roma people (almost three quarters of the 
respondents view them as unlikeable); see Chart 6.
57 M. Diro, ‘Hospodářská komora otevřela asistenční kanceláře na Ukrajině a v Srbsku. Podpoří 
zaměstnavatele, pomůže českým úřadům i uchazečům o práci, aby zrychlila zdlouhavé pro-
cedury vládních režimů na zaměstnávání pracovníků ze zahraničí’, HK ČR, 17 December 
2018, https://www.komora.cz/files/uploads/2018/07/20180730_PODKLADY_Re%C5%BEim-
Ukrajina_GRAFY.pdf.
58 ‘Postoje české veřejnosti k cizincům – březen 2019’, CVVM, 9 April 2019, https://cvvm.soc.
cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4899/f9/ov190409.pdf.
59 ‘Postoje české veřejnosti k zaměstnávání cizinců – březen 2019’, CVVM, 12 April 2019, https://
cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4903/f9/ov190412.pdf.
60 ‘Vztah české veřejnosti k národnostním skupinám žijícím v ČR – březen 2019’, CVVM, 
15 April 2019, https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4905/f9/
ov190415.pdf.
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chart 5. Czechs’ opinions about foreigners who have lived in the Czech Repu-
blic for a long time 
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chart 6. Perception of ethnic groups living in the Czech Republic
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The coalition cabinet led by Andrej Babiš which has governed the country since 
June 2018 has not yet managed to develop a compromise regarding the access 
of immigrant workers to the Czech labour market. Although a bill on the resi-
dence of foreigners in the Czech Republic (which was put forward by the pre-
ceding Babiš cabinet, 2017–2018) is being processed in parliament, it is uncer-
tain whether this bill will be passed61. It provides for the possibility of issuing 
so-called ‘extraordinary employee visas’ for one year to third country citizens 
in a number adjusted to the needs of the labour market. A greater openness to 
migrants has been blocked by the Social Democrats, who co-form the govern-
ment and who are demanding further support for pay rises and, in order to 
achieve this goal (along with the demand to increase the minimum wage), they 
are insisting on restricting the influx of immigrant workers from outside the 
EU who usually have lower wage expectations than Czechs or workers from EU 
member states. Furthermore, the political left has a number of tools that allow 
it to regulate labour migration. Its representatives not only lead the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs – they are also in charge of visa issues (through 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and foreigners’ residence in the Czech Repub-
lic (via the Ministry of the Interior). The Ministry of Labour is arguing that the 
best solution to cope with the shortage of workers is to activate selected social 
groups, especially elderly people62 and women returning from maternity leave. 
The ministry is preparing, for example, support for the development of a net-
work of nurseries and facilitations to popularise the practice of job sharing. In-
cidentally, the OECD (amongst other institutions) has recommended this to the 
Czech Republic63. Given the high activity rate of people aged 15–64 years (which 
reached 77% in mid 201864), the room for manoeuvre using Czech employees to 
cope with the labour shortage will not be large. 
61 The progress of work of the Chamber of Deputies can be tracked on the website www.psp.cz/
sqw/historie.sqw?o=8&t=203.
62 133,000 of the over 2 million people at the age of 65 years and older living in the Czech Re-
public were employed towards the end of 2017, which means an increase of a third as com-
pared to the preceding year. Cf. D. Jakešová, ‘O pracující důchodce je zájem. Příležitostí pro 
seniory ještě nikdy nebylo tolik’, Lidovky.cz, 1 April 2018, https://www.lidovky.cz/byznys/
firmy-a-trhy/o-pracujici-duchodce-je-zajem-prilezitosti-pro-seniory-jeste-nikdy-nebylo-
tolik.A180329_165313_firmy-trhy_pkk. 
63 ‘OECD Economic Surveys: Czech Republic 2018’, OECD Publishing, Paris 2018, https://doi.
org/10.1787/eco_surveys-cze-2018-en.
64 ‘Míry zaměstnanosti, nezaměstnanosti a ekonomické aktivity – červen 2018’, ČSÚ, 31 July 
2018, https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/cri/miry-zamestnanosti-nezamestnanosti-a-ekonom-
icke-aktivity-cerven-2018; for comparison, the same rate in Poland at that time was 70.2% 
(according to the Central Statistical Office of Poland).
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4. labour migration to the czech republic from eu member states – 
the last resort for entrepreneurs 
The restrictions in access to the labour market obviously do not affect EU 
citizens. Slovaks, who share a similar cultural background with Czechs, ac-
count for 35% of all immigrant workers in the Czech Republic and are pre-
dominant among foreigners working there. The third most numerous group 
(after Ukrainians) is formed by Poles. As with Slovaks, the number of Poles 
working in the Czech Republic is smaller than the official number of Polish 
residents in this country65. The next positions are taken by citizens of Romania 
and Bulgaria, the EU’s poorest countries, and thus those where the economic 
stimulus for changing a job is the strongest. The influx of immigrant workers 
from Southern Europe is a new phenomenon. Unemployment rates there have 
been the highest in the EU (see Chart 1), especially among young people, over 
the past few years. The number of Spanish and Portuguese employees work-
ing for Czech firms has tripled and the number of Greek and Italian workers 
has doubled over the past decade. In aggregate there are 11,000 workers from 
this region in the Czech Republic. Almost a half of them are Italians, who also 
tend to start their own businesses more often than those from other Southern 
European nations. 
chart 7. Foreigners living in the Czech Republic (by citizenship)
Ukraine: 23.2% (131 709)
Mongolia: 1.6% (9 081)
USA: 1.7% (9 510)
Romania: 2.6% (14 684)
Bulgaria: 2.8% (15 593)
Germany: 3.8% (21 267)
Poland: 3.8% (21 279)
Russia: 6.7% (38 223)
Other countries: 22.5% (127 625)
Vietnam: 10.8% (61 143)
Slovakia: 20.6% (116 817)
566 931
As of 31 December 2018, according to data on permanent and temporary residence. Foreigners account for 
5.3% of all residents of the Czech Republic.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Czech Repu-
blic (Čtvrtletní zpráva o migraci – IV 2018) and the Czech Statistical Office
65 This proves that Czech firms are looking for employees in the frontier regions and is also a con-
sequence of the more liberal regulations concerning residence registration (there is no obliga-
tion to register residence for a period not longer than three months). Cf. Charts 7 and 8.
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chart 8. Foreigners working in the Czech Republic (by country of origin)
Ukraine: 21.7% (142 967)
Mongolia: 0.9% (5 876)
Moldova: 0.8% (5 281)
Romania: 7.0% (45 824)
Bulgaria: 5.5% (36 273)
Germany: 1.2% (8 104)
Poland: 7.2% (47 441)
Hungary: 2.9% (18 904)United Kingdom: 0.9% (6 001)
Vietnam: 5.1% (33 730)
Russia: 2.7% (17 703)
Other countries: 8.0% (52 658)
Italy: 0.8% (5 268)
Other EU member states: 3.5% (22 960)
Slovakia: 31.8% (209 529)
658 519
As of 31 December 2018. These data include also self-employed people. Towards the end of 2018, fore-
igners accounted for 12.5% of all employed people in the Czech Republic. 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office
Since the procedure of employing citizens of EU member states is not compli-
cated, they form the largest group of workers hired by the only two non-state 
companies among the top ten Czech employers (cf. Table 1, page 42): Škoda 
Auto (controlled by Volkswagen) and Agrofert (which operates in the food and 
agricultural sector and has been part of Andrej Babiš’s business empire66). In 
the case of Škoda Auto, which manufactures cars in Mladá Boleslav and Kvas-
iny, the issue of employing foreigners is often discussed in the media. In au-
tumn 2018 it became a topic of the campaign preceding local elections. The 
mayor of Mladá Boleslav (in office for 12 years), Raduan Nwelati (whose father 
is Syrian and mother Czech), launched a campaign under the slogan ‘Boleslav 
je Boleslaváků’67 and announced ‘zero tolerance for foreigners’ who do not re-
spect Czech law. 
66 Technically, since 2017 Agrofert has formally been owned by two trust funds, one benefi-
ciary of which is Prime Minister Andrej Babiš.
67 Roughly translated as ‘Boleslav belongs to Boleslavians’.
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This was partly a reaction to the real increase in crime rates among foreign-
ers68 working above all for Škoda Auto and its subcontractors. Even though 
they account for around a quarter of the 45,000-strong population, Nwelati 
claimed that they had committed almost all of the serious crimes, particularly 
emphasising the bad behaviour of Poles69. Police officers from Poland and Slo-
vakia took part in patrols as part of a monthly pilot programme in autumn 
2018. Similar problems at the plant in Kvasiny located close to the Polish border 
(where 3,000 out of the 11,000 workers are foreigners, mainly Poles, Romani-
ans and Bulgarians) have been successfully curbed due to an intensified police 
presence. A significant section of Agrofert’s employees are Romanians and Bul-
garians, but also Ukrainians and Vietnamese. However, the firm has avoided 
giving precise answers to questions regarding this issue, while the problem of 
the conditions in which they live and their low wages has been raised by the 
media, including outlets linked to the Social Democrats who co-form the coali-
tion government70. 
68 L. Nováková, ‘Podíl cizinců na kriminalitě v Mladé Boleslavi řešíme novým způsobem’, Pol-
icie ČR, 5 September 2018, http://www.policie.cz/clanek/podil-cizincu-na-kriminalite-v-
mlade-boleslavi-resime-novym-zpusobem.aspx and ‘Unikátní projekt přivádí do Bolesla-
vi slovenské a polské policisty’, Boleslavský deník, 4 September 2018, https://boleslavsky.
denik.cz/zpravy_region/unikatni-projekt-privadi-do-boleslavi-slovenske-a-polske-poli-
cisty-20180904.html.
69 J. Kolina, ‘Škoda ghetto’, Týden, no. 37/2018.
70 Cf. Z. Vlasatá, ‘Jak Andrej Babiš dává práci: ukrajinské agenturní mafii’, Deník Referendum, 
28 June 2017, http://denikreferendum.cz/clanek/25552-jak-andrej-babis-dava-praci-ukra-
jinske-agenturni-mafii and M. Cápová, ‘Firma z koncernu Agrofert před volbami nadělovala. 
Dělníkům dala 10 tisíc’, Echo24.cz, 19 October 2017, https://echo24.cz/a/pv6BA/firma-z-kon-
cernu-agrofert-pred-volbami-nadelovala-delnikum-dala-10-tisic.
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poles on the czech labour market
Since 2014, i.e. since the beginning of the economic revival, the number 
of Polish citizens working in the Czech Republic (both those employed by 
Czech companies and self-employed) has grown incessantly. In the case 
of self-employed people, a constant increase has been seen already since 
2006, which is linked to the rapid development of Polish-Czech trade after 
both countries joined the EU. Furthermore, their EU membership means 
that the administrative restrictions in access to the Czech labour market do 
not affect Poles. Other arguments for taking jobs in the Czech Republic in-
clude: the geographic proximity, the relatively small language barrier and 
the large demand for labour in the Czech Republic, including at production 
plants and mines located close to the Polish border. The high demand for 
labour in many cases also means higher wages than in Poland. 
chart 9. Number of Poles on the Czech labour market 2011–2018 
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Source: On the basis of data from the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, Czech Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs and the Czech Statistical Office
Over the past few years, Poles have accounted for around 8% of immigrant 
workers employed in the Czech Republic by local companies, and their share 
in the group of immigrant workers – citizens of EU and EFTA member states 
– in 2018 rose to over 12%. Only Slovaks (33.7%) and Ukrainians (21.3%) make 
up a larger share of immigrant workers employed in the Czech Republic. 
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chart 10. Poles working in the Czech Republic by education, positions and industries
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Source: Trade and Investment Promotion Section of the Polish Embassy in Prague on the basis of data 
from the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade and Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Polish workers in the Czech Republic are predominantly male (68% of em-
ployees and 67% of entrepreneurs as of end of 2018). At the end of 2016, only 
1.7% of Polish workers held managerial positions, while the professions 
that predominated among Polish citizens employed in the Czech Republic 
included: machine and equipment operators (43%), auxiliary and unquali-
fied workforce (20%) and craftsmen and mechanics (19%). The predominant 
sectors were the food processing sector (35%) and office administration ac-
tivities (22%); the construction (8%) and mining (6%) industries also had 
a significant share. Thus it can be seen that Poles are hired predominantly 
in those segments of the Czech labour market where higher education is 
not required. However, this does not mean that certain skills are not need-
ed there – qualified and experienced workers are needed, for example, at 
hard coal mines (the closures of these have been recently postponed by the 
Czech government, for the time being from 2023 to 2030). Workers in this 
sector are often provided from Poland by specialised labour agencies, for 
example, Polcarbo or Alpex (the latter employed the twelve Polish miners 
who died in the catastrophe caused by a methane explosion at the Czech 
mine OKD in Stonava in December 2018). Such agencies employ the workers  
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who were made redundant in the process of restructuring Polish mines but 
they are also eager to hire retired miners71. The largest employer in this 
sector is the OKD company which in 2017 employed around 1,800 Poles; the 
firm is still short of around 350 employees. 
chart 11. The share of Poles among immigrant workers employed in the 
Czech Republic
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Labour and Social Affairs and the Czech Statistical Office
Regardless of the long-lasting gradual increase in absolute numbers, the 
share of Polish entrepreneurs in the total number of foreigners authorised 
to operate on the Czech market is relatively low – less than 3%. This is much 
less than the percentage of Poles employed in the Czech Republic (7.9%). In 
the former case, Poles have been outpaced by the Vietnamese, Ukrainians 
(both 24%), Slovaks (20%), Germans and Russians (both 3.5%). While citi-
zens of EU member states clearly predominate (64.4%) in the group of im-
migrant workers employed in the Czech Republic, in the group of entrepre-
neurs, the proportions are almost exactly the inverse (38.1% from the EU).
71 In Poland, miners may retire after they have worked for 25 years full-time and constantly in un-
derground conditions (so they in many cases retire at the age of 45–50). In the Czech Republic, 
after the retirement age for miners was reduced by seven years in 2016, they can retire on gen-
eral terms (under certain conditions linked to the number of shifts they have worked) at the ear-
liest at the age of a little less than 56 and they may choose early retirement at the age of 53.
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chart 12. The share of Poles among foreign entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic
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Source: On the basis of data from the Czech Statistical Office
The increase in the number of Poles working in the Czech Republic is cor-
related not only to the falling unemployment rate but also to the rapid de-
velopment of bilateral trade following EU accession. In 2004–2018, Polish 
exports to the Czech Republic grew by 460%, and Czech exports to Poland 
by 370%. In the same timeframe, the number of Polish entrepreneurs in the 
Czech Republic doubled, and the number of Poles employed in the Czech 
Republic grew by 500%.
chart 13. Czech-Polish trade in 2004–2018
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Source: On the basis of data from the Czech Statistical Office
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III.  The InflaTIon of waGes and The InflaTIon 
of demands – The labour markeT In The 
hands of employees
Over the past few years employees have had increasingly more say on the Czech 
labour market. Since the beginning of 2014, the number of the unemployed 
has fallen visibly, while the number of vacancies has been growing (see Charts 
14 and 15). Since spring 2017, when the number of vacancies reached around 
160,000, these record-high statistics have been growing further72. Since April 
2018, an unprecedented situation has been seen where the number of jobs 
available each month exceeds the number of unemployed people (in mid-2019 
it was almost 150,000 higher). 
chart 14. The number of unemployed people and job vacancies in the Czech 
Republic in 2008–2019 (in thousands) 
VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII VI XII VI VIXII
0
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Vacancies
Unemployed people
Source: Author’s own compilation based on data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and 
Kurzy.cz
72 Cf. Statistiky nezaměstnanosti, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, 
portal.mpsv.cz/sz/stat/nz.
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chart 15. The number of unemployed people and job vacancies in the Czech 
Republic in 2018 and 2019 (in thousands) 
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The strengthening position of employees on the labour market is well illus-
trated by the results of public opinion polls showing a decreasing willingness 
to compromise in search for a job and a decreasing mobility of Czechs73. Only 
14% see problems with finding a job; this being the lowest percentage since the 
survey was introduced in 2004 and almost four times less than in 201374.
73 According to a public opinion poll conducted in June 2018 by the Public Opinion Research 
Centre (CVVM) only 16% of Czechs would be ready to take a job that would require moving 
to a different place (20% in 2015), and 17% one that would require ‘longer, e.g. two-hour’ com-
muting during the day (27% in 2015). One of the reasons for low mobility is that the model of 
owning a house or a flat prevails over renting, which poses greater barriers when a job offer 
from a different location arises. Less than a quarter of Czechs live in rented flats, and this 
rate is lower than the EU average of 30%. Cf. E. Sovová, ‘Analýza: Bydlení je v Česku drahé. 
Proč tomu tak je, glosují experti’, iDnes.cz, 19 June 2018, finance.idnes.cz/analyza-bydleni-
hypoteky-ceny-zdrazovani-fic-/sporeni.aspx?c=A180618_111709_sporeni_sov. 
 The general increase in the unwillingness to accept inconvenience linked to employment 
is also manifested in a lower readiness to accept a job that would require working over-
time (12 percentage points than in 2015, to 64%), on weekends (10 percentage points lower, 
to 50%) or one characterised by a ‘higher tempo of work than the previous place of employ-
ment’ (15 percentage points lower, to 56%). Furthermore, the share of individuals who in case 
of being unemployed would look for a specific job and not just for any job has clearly grown 
(by 10 percentage points to the level of 72%).
74 At the same time, a record-high percentage of Czechs (24%) are convinced that finding 
a proper job is not a problem, while a further 56% believe that finding any job, though not 
necessarily the desired one, is not a problem. Cf. ‘Česká veřejnost o nezaměstnanosti – 
červen 2018’, Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 30 July 2018, https://cvvm.soc.cas.
cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4677/f9/eu180727.pdf.
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1. The galloping wages: can the economy take this?
The good economic results achieved in 2014 and 2015 did not bring about an 
immediate increase in wages (see Charts 16 and 17). A significant section of em-
ployers were cautious after years of crisis. A clear and constant acceleration in 
increase in wages, including in real terms, has only been seen since mid-2017. 
Data for the first three quarters of 2018 showed that the increase in real wages 
(6.2–6.6% y/y) was clearly faster than economic growth (2.4–4.4%) and the in-
crease in workforce productivity (0.2–2.5% calculated as GDP/h and 0.7–1.5% 
y/y calculated as GDP/employee)75. The increase in wages was thus mostly an 
effect of the shortage on the labour market and was stronger outside the capital 
city (although the average wage in Prague is still clearly the highest as com-
pared to other regions) and in the lower section of the wage pyramid; this re-
flects above all the demand for less qualified workers. Wages have grown most 
noticeably in the automotive industry (among other industries). 
chart 16. GDP growth in the Czech Republic in 2014–2018 (quarterly, y/y) 
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The data refer to real changes, cleared of seasonal fluctuations 
Source: Author’s own compilation on the basis of data from the Czech Statistical Office
75 Cf. ‘Mzdy předhánějí produktivitu a napravují minulost. Jen to nesmí trvat příliš dlouho’, 
ČT24, 28 January 2019, https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/ekonomika/2712458-mzdy-predhane-
ji-produktivitu-a-napravuji-minulost-jen-nesmi-trvat-prilis-dlouho.
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chart  17. Wage growth dynamics in the Czech Republic in 2014–2019 
(quarterly, y/y)
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preceding year (=100). 
Source: Author’s own compilation on the basis of data from the Czech Statistical Office
One good example of how the wage inflation is gaining momentum within sec-
tor is provided by the retail trade sector employing around 180,000 people and 
having five representatives on the list of top 25 employers (cf. Table 1). This 
trend could be noticed already in spring 2018, when the Lidl chain increased 
its starting (gross) wage for cashiers by a quarter to the equivalent of around 
1,100 euros. In the first month the firm saw an increase in the number of indi-
viduals willing to take the job by 50%, thus sending a signal to the market that 
could not be ignored by the competition76. The challenge was accepted amongst 
others by another German chain, Penny Market, whose managers in the Czech 
Republic (where it employs 7,000 people) have been making efforts to reduce 
staff turnover (which is 35% annually) by introducing a wide range of employ-
ee benefits77. It is becoming more popular to offer free of charge commuting to 
work (for example Tesco offers this). In quarters II and III of 2018, the entire 
sector saw an increase in expenses on wages by 10.8% y/y, while the level of 
employment grew by 2.1–2.2% and revenue by 6.9–7.2%78. 
76 M. Šenk, ‘Nejlepší čas říct si o přidání: Firmy zatím tlačí k ochotě zvyšovat mzdy nedostatek 
lidí, ale boom ekonomiky pomalu končí’, Hospodářské noviny, 19 April 2018.
77 Cf. M. Patočková, ‘Šéf Penny Marketu: Neřídíme se jen Lidlem, na vyšší mzdy dáme sto 
milionů’, iDnes.cz, 16 July 2018, https://ekonomika.idnes.cz/penny-market-vyssi-mzdy-
rozhovor-martin-peffek-lidl-pcd-/ekoakcie.aspx?c=A180715_214752_ekoakcie_zaz.
78 Cf. ‘Obchod, pohostinství, ubytování – časové řady – Základní finanční ukazatele – čtvrtletní 
– Klasifikace NACE Rev. 2 (CZ-NACE)’, ČSÚ, 14 June 2018, https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/1-
malzfu_b. The data are even more telling if one considers only the retail traders employing 
a minimum of 250 people – in quarters II and III of 2018 their expenses on wages grew by 
10–10.2% y/y, while the level of employment grew by only 2.2% and the level of revenues by 
3.9–4.3% y/y. This means that they increased expenses on wages slightly more than medi-
um-sized retailers, while the increase in the employment level was similar and the increase 
in revenues was lower.
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Table 1.  Top 25 employers in the Czech Republic in 2019
Name
Number of 
employees in the 
Czech Republic
Industry  
(in the case 
of companies)
Owner  
(in the case 
of companies)
1.
Ministry of the Interior 
(including the police 
and fire service)
66,500 (including 
49,000 for the 
police and 11,000 
for the fire 
service)
– –
2. Škoda Auto
35,500 (including 
2,800 temporary 
workers)
Car manufacturer Volkswagen Group (Germany)
3. Česká pošta 30,800 Postal services The Treasury
4. Ministry of Defence (including the army)
29,500 (including 
22,000 the army) – –
5.
Ministry of Justice 
(including courts and 
the prison service)
26,500 – –
6. Agrofert 25,200
Food and 
agriculture, 
chemical, media
Andrej Babiš 
(currently via two 
trust funds)
7. Grupa České dráhy 23,500
Passenger and 
commodity 
transport
The Treasury
8.
Ministry of Finance 
(including the 
fiscal and customs 
administration) 
23,000 
(including 
16,000 fiscal 
administration 
and 5,500 
customs 
administration)
– –
9. ČEZ 22,300 Energy sector The Treasury (69.78%)
10.
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs 
(including job centres)
21,000 (including 
11,500 in job 
centres)
– –
11. Kaufland Czech Republic 18,000 Retail trade
Schwarz Gruppe 
(Germany)
12. Railway Infrastructure Administration 17,500
Railway network 
management The Treasury
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Name
Number of 
employees in the 
Czech Republic
Industry  
(in the case 
of companies)
Owner  
(in the case 
of companies)
13. Ahold Czech Republic 17,000 Retail trade Ahold Delhaize (Holland)
14.
Continental 
(Automotive 
and Barum)
16,500 (11,500 
Automotive and 
5,000 Barum)
Tyres (Barum) and 
vehicle components 
(Automotive)
Continental AG 
(Germany)
15. COOP Group 13,500 Retail trade
47 Czech co-
operatives with 
a total of 130,000 
members
16. Siemens Czech Republic 13,000
Production 
of electric 
equipment and 
related services
Siemens Group 
(Germany)
17. Charles University in Prague 11,500 – –
18. Tesco Stores ČR 11,200 Retail trade Tesco Group (United Kingdom)
19.
Prague Public 
Transport Company 
(DPP)
11,000 Local public transport Prague city
20. Česká spořitelna 10,300 Financial services Erste Bank (Austria)
21. OKD 9,500 Hard coal mining
The Treasury (via 
the state-owned 
company Prisko)
22. Lidl 9,000 Retail trade Schwarz Gruppe (Germany)
23. PPF Group 8,800 Financial services Petr Kellner (98.92%)
24. Czech Academy of Sciences 8,000. – –
25. Komerční banka 7,500 Financial services Société Générale (60.4%; France)
Source: Author’s own compilations
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Sometimes the pay rises and benefits offered by the companies turn out to be in-
sufficient, and their trade unions threaten to go on strike. This is the case especial-
ly with larger companies; the main example is the company which is the largest 
private employer in the Czech Republic – Škoda Auto. Already in 2017, the average 
(gross) wage of blue-collar workers was the equivalent of over 1,600 euros. This is 
more than other large automotive corporations operating in the Czech Republic of-
fer79, but also clearly less than can be expected from the German factories of Volk-
swagen Group, which Czech employees treat as a point of reference. During months 
of negotiations the management of the corporation threatened that production of 
some models (especially Superb) could be moved to Germany80. This led to a new 
wage compromise being reached, and the basic wages have risen by 12% since April 
2018, and the average wage, including benefits (for example, for overtime work), 
has grown by more than 20% (and even by over 30% at the Kvasiny plant)81. The 
trade union organisation (being one of the most numerous in the country) man-
aged to maintain Saturdays as days off (however, with a 15-shift working week) 
at the largest factory (Mladá Boleslav) and to guarantee that the 18-shift working 
week at the Kvasiny factory would apply only until the end of 2018.
During an economic boom, many firms reach out for employees from labour 
agencies who will be easier to dismiss when the demand for the manufactured 
goods or provided services falls back. Within the timeframe of five years, un-
til 2017, the number of employees of this kind in the Czech Republic increased 
by two thirds – to around 280,000 (agencies themselves estimate that agencies 
79 The monthly wage at Hyundai and TPCA at similar positions is around 1,350 euros. Howev-
er, their numbers of employees are much lower: 3,400 and 2,700, respectively. Cf. P. Slezák, 
‘Dělníci ve Škodě Auto jsou placeni nejlépe v Česku, i tak požadují dvouciferné navýšení 
mezd. Díky zisku na to máme nárok, říkají’, Hospodářské noviny, 19 March 2018, byznys.ih-
ned.cz/c1-66078670-delnici-ve-skode-auto-jsou-placeni-nejlepe-v-cesku-i-tak-pozaduji-na-
vyseni-mezd-o-18-procent-diky-zisku-na-to-mame-narok-rikaji.
80 This issue was resumed already after the wage compromise was reached. The company’s 
Czech trade unions confirmed in September 2018 that the management had raised the issue 
of moving part of the production of the Superb model to Emden (north-western Germany), to 
which they were opposed. According to official communications, VW for the time being in-
tends to expand the production of the Karoq model in Osnabrück (Lower Saxony). Cf. R. Mul-
ler, ‘VW's Skoda unions object to renewed talks on production moves’, Reuters.com, 13 Sep-
tember 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-skoda/vws-skoda-unions-object-to-
renewed-talks-on-production-moves-idUSKCN1LT2X3.
81 ‘Historická výplata: zaměstnanci Škody Auto brali až 100 tisíc’, Echo24.cz, 12 May 2018, 
echo24.cz/a/SPGnu/historicka-vyplata-zamestnanci-skody-auto-brali-az-100-tisic and 
P. Svačina, ‘Kasy cinkají, zaměstnanci Škody Auto utrácejí rekordních sto tisíc hrubého’, 
iDnes.cz, 14 May 2018, praha.idnes.cz/skoda-auto-rekordni-vyplata-mzda-pres-sto-tisic-ko-
run-trzby-obchody-bonusy-mlada-boleslav-g81-/praha-zpravy.aspx?c=A180512_400894_
praha-zpravy_klu.
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operating in the grey economy account for the same number of workers)82. This 
would mean that over 6% of legally employed staff are agency workers. Their po-
sition at the largest firms is increasingly stronger partly owing to the activity 
of the trade unions. At Škoda Auto, 90% of agency workers belong to the trade 
unions, and the firm is so certain about its good performance in the future (or 
behaves so in order to attract employees without the need to re-train them), that 
it is increasingly prepared to offer them regular employment contracts83. 
2. The German labour market – an ideal for the trade unions
Referring to the situation on the German market is an essential part of the Czech 
public debate on wages. The political left and the trade unions are arguing that 
private employers should be forced to bring the wages closer to the German level 
through a combination of various measures of influence: new regulations (in-
cluding those on the minimum wage), wage rises in the public sector and direct 
pressure on large employers84. The average wage in the Czech Republic (which 
grew nominally by 19% in 2010–2017) in the same period fell from 37.1% to 36.8% 
measured as a percentage of the average wage in Germany’s eastern federal states 
and grew very slightly as compared to the western federal states (from 28.3% to 
28.9%)85. At the same time, Czech workforce productivity (calculated as GDP per 
employee) is 77% of the German figure86, so it is much better than the wage ra-
82 J. Richter, ‘Pracovní trh se mění a zahraničních agenturních zaměstnanců v Česku přibývá. 
I odbory mezi nimi hledají nové členy’, Ekonom, 29 June 2017, https://ekonom.ihned.cz/c1-
65783500-agenturnich-zamestnancu-pribyva-odbory-mezi-nimi-hledaji-nove-cleny.
83 Although the total number of the company’s regular employees increased by almost 12% 
in 2016–2017, the number of agency workers dropped there by over 19%, to a level of 2,800. 
However, this is still more than 8% of the total number of the company’s employees. 
Cf. ‘Výroční zpráva za rok 2017’, Škoda Auto, op. cit. 
84 These are not the only demands of the trade unions. They also want, for example, to extend the 
basic period of paid holiday leave in the private sector from four to five weeks and to reduce 
the weekly working time from 40 to 37.5 hours within five years. One demand that has been 
accepted by the ČSSD, included in the government’s agenda, and adopted in the parliament is 
the liquidation of the so-called ‘suspension period’ that was introduced a decade ago, which 
means that starting from 1 July 2019 employees receive 60% of the standard remuneration dur-
ing the first three days of sick leave (they have not previously been paid for this period). 
85 These differences would be slightly smaller for net wages, given higher taxation of labour 
in Germany (49.7% in 2017) than in the Czech Republic (43.4%). Cf. V. Lavička, D. Chripák, 
‘Německé a české mzdy. Příkré rozdíly se za poslední léta nezmírnily’, Hospodářské noviny, 
29 May 2018, https://infografiky.ihned.cz/nemecke-mzdy/r~bcc161bc633411e89b0fac1f6b2
20ee8/ and ‘Tax Wedge’, OECD, 2019, https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-wedge.htm.
86 Workforce productivity calculated as GDP per hour worked (which, for example, the OECD 
views as a better measurement) allows, for example, to better compare individuals em-
ployed on a full-time and part-time basis. It is, however, lower – 59% of the German level. 
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tio. Furthermore, the trade unions emphasise that the average Czech employee 
spends 31% more time at work annually than his/her German equivalent87. All 
these data are provided as proof of exploitation of Czech workers by companies 
which are often controlled by foreign corporations. The person who voices these 
demands on behalf of the workers is the head of the largest trade union confed-
eration, Josef Středula, who since mid-2015 has been conducting an extensive 
campaign under the slogan ‘No more cheap labour’. Although he still closely co-
operates with the ČSSD, since he was elected head of the trade union confedera-
tion (around 300,000 members) in 2014, he discontinued the tradition of blindly 
supporting this party’s ideas (trade union leaders have often been nominated to 
prominent positions backed by the ČSSD). Středula has been successfully press-
ing on the government though, not through demonstrations but rather through 
negotiations as part of the trilateral commission and professional communica-
tion in the media88. In effect, it is the Social Democrats, plunged in internal con-
flicts, that hopes that the trade union will offer it a chance for a new impulse that 
will revive public support for the political left.
3. The German labour market – a nightmare for employers
The Chamber of Commerce is the opponent of the trade unions. This chamber 
represents the employers whose head, Vladimír Dlouhý, used to be a right-wing 
politician and served as the Minister of Industry and Trade. Employers and some 
economists point to a number of inconsistencies in the trade unions’ argumenta-
tion – in the first place the fact that when comparing wages, one should consider 
the purchasing power value they represent: the nominal price level in Germany 
is two thirds higher89. Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce also empha-
sise that Czech workers are employed on a full-time basis much more frequently 
than German ones (mothers as a rule return to the labour market faster after 
Cf. Chart 18 and J. Svoboda, ‘V práci jsme víc než Němci, ale jen za třetinovou mzdu’, 
Novinky.cz, 29 March 2018, novinky.cz/ekonomika/467664-v-praci-jsme-vic-nez-nemci-
ale-jen-za-tretinovou-mzdu.html.
87 1,356 hours in 2017 (the shortest time in the OECD) in the case of Germany and 1,776 in 
the case of the Czech Republic. For comparison, Poland’s result is 1,895 hours, Slovakia’s 
1,714 hours, and the OECD average is 1,759 hours. Cf. data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm.
88 D. Klimeš, ‘Odborový předák Josef Středula šéfuje Česku. Po Bohuslavu Sobotkovi mu nad-
bíhá i Andrej Babiš’, Ekonom, 2 May 2018, https://ekonom.ihned.cz/c1-66126610-jak-odbory-
ovladly-cesko.
89 D. Marek, ‘Mzdový dumping je mýtus’, e15.cz, 25 August 2017, https://www.e15.cz/nazory/
komentar-davida-marka-mzdovy-dumping-je-mytus-1336602.
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giving birth in Germany but they usually take part-time jobs)90. This skews the 
data concerning the number of hours worked by an average employee91. 
Employers also claim that if the argument concerning ‘exploitation’ of work-
ers by Western corporations active in the Czech Republic had been true, the 
corporations should have generated a higher operational profit in the Czech 
Republic, which usually is not the case. Possible differences in profitability, for 
example, between the Czech Republic and Germany are relatively small, which 
is linked to investment activity: when the expected profitability falls, firms of-
ten decide to move part of their production estimating the related costs, and in 
the case of investments in the Czech Republic one of the major advantages has 
been the relatively low labour costs. However, this means that the share of the 
added value of the production in the Czech Republic as compared to the value 
of the final product is relatively low at 39%, while that in Germany is 51%92. 
In the opinion of employers, the solution is not to artificially raise wages (which 
will not work in the longer term, given the low added value of production) but 
rather to make efforts to change the existing economic model. They believe 
that the model based on ‘assembly plants’ should evolve into a model typical, 
for example, of Germany, with high added value and high workforce produc-
tivity, which – as a consequence – will generate a rise in wages that will not 
pose a threat to production. In other words, employees are arguing that before 
it is possible to put an end to ‘cheap labour’ (something the trade unions are 
instating upon), it is necessary to put an end to the ‘cheap economy’93.
90 The share of individuals employed part-time in 2018 was 6.2%, while in Germany it is 26.8%. 
The EU average is 18.5%. In the case of Poland, the value is the same as in the Czech Republic, 
and in the case of Slovakia it is 4.8%. The low popularity of part-time employment is partly 
a result of unfavourable regulations concerning insurance contributions deducted from wag-
es. This issue was discussed in more detail in: D. Klimeš, Jak probudit..., op.cit., page 71. 
91 If one compares the average number of hours worked weekly by full-time workers, it turns 
out that Germans (40.9) work even longer than Czechs (40.3), and the Czech result is close to 
the EU average. Cf. ‘Zkrácení pracovní doby či pětitýdenní zákonná dovolená? Průmyslníci 
jsou ostře proti’, ČT24, 16 September 2018, ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/ekonomika/2595950-zkra-
ceni-pracovni-doby-ci-petitydeni-zakonna-dovolena-prumyslnici-jsou-ostre-proti.
92 Ibid. 
93 Cf. D. Klimeš, ‘Konec levné práce se nedá přikázat. Nejprve musí skončit levná ekonomika’, 
Český rozhlas Plus, 13 September 2018, plus.rozhlas.cz/david-klimes-konec-levne-prace-se-
neda-prikazat-nejprve-musi-skoncit-levna-7610936.
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chart 18. Changes in workforce productivity in the Czech Republic as compa-
red to Germany and the Visegrad Group countries in 2006–2018
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4. The creeping change of the economic model – a challenge 
to investors 
This change of the work model is gradually taking place anyway, and one of 
the factors that have made it necessary is the fact that workforce productiv-
ity has been increasing at a slower rate than wage growth over the past few 
years94. In the short run, wages are not immediately adjusted to the change 
of the market situation (which in the economy is defined by the telling term 
‘sticky wage model’). In the Czech Republic, this economic rule was visible in 
particular in 2014 and 2015, when wages were growing at a slower rate than 
GDP and workforce productivity (see Charts 16 and 17). However, in the long-
er run, a company where wages are growing faster than productivity in the 
first place will be forced to cut production and employment and, over time, to 
improve productivity (for example, through capital investment but this will 
further reduce employment levels), wind up the business or move production 
94 Workforce productivity (in this case GDP per unit of time worked) in 2014–2018 annually 
grew on average by 2.1%, which was clearly below the average annual increase in real wag-
es in this timeframe, i.e. 4.2%. Cf. ‘GDP per hour worked’, OECD, 2019, https://data.oecd.
org/lprdty/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm, ‘OECD Productivity Statistics’, OECD, www.oecd-ili-
brary.org/employment/data/oecd-productivity-statistics/gdp-per-capita-and-productivity-
growth_data-00685-en and ‘Mzdy, náklady práce – časové řady’, ČSÚ, https://www.czso.cz/
csu/czso/pmz_cr.
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to a place where the expected profitability will be higher. Like in many other 
countries, workforce productivity is significantly lower elsewhere across the 
country than in the capital city95.
The need to increase wages is a factor that reduces the profitability of invest-
ments of the foreign parent companies of many Czech firms. At the beginning 
of 2018 over 38% of Czech companies’ share capital was owned by foreign enti-
ties96. According to the latest available data that enable the situation to be com-
pared in various countries, in 2015, companies controlled by foreign entities in 
the Czech Republic accounted for 42% of added value generated (35% in the case 
of Poland and 20% in the case of Germany)97. 
However, the parent companies have already managed to capitalise on the high 
economic growth when the wages did not go up so much, while in 2018 they 
reduced reinvestment level by a fifth to keep money flow from dividends. 2016, 
2017 and 2018 were the best years for them in the last decade, and the value of 
dividends paid abroad reached 6.1% of GDP (11.3 billion euros) in 2016, 5.3% of 
GDP (10.5 billion euros) one year later, and 5.5% of GDP (11.5 billion euros) in 
201898. Over 11% of the dividends transferred abroad were paid by the six larg-
est banks operating in the Czech Republic which thus transferred a definite 
majority of the generated profits99. 
However, in the longer timeframe, the reinvestment rate in the financial sec-
tor is around 50%, while the sectors most affected by the outflow of capital 
include: telecommunication (16% reinvestment), wholesale and retail trade 
95 Over the past few years productivity in Prague was even two thirds higher than in the rest of 
the country. Cf. ‘Productivity and Jobs in a Globalised World’, OECD, 2018, oecd-ilibrary.org/
sites/9789264293137-4-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264293137-4-en. 
96 This includes 13% of capital owned by entities from so-called ‘tax havens.’ Domestic enti-
ties control 54% of total share capital, while the remainder of over 7% belongs to unidenti-
fied owners. Data from Bisnode; cf. ‘Zahraniční kapitál v české ekonomice posiluje’, Staveb-
ní fórum, 10 May 2018, http://www.stavebni-forum.cz/cs/newsroom/zahranicni-kapital-v-
ceske-ekonomice-posiluje/.
97 ‘Value Added in Foreign Controlled Enterprises’, Eurostat, 25 March 2019, http://appsso.eu-
rostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=egi_va1&lang=en. 
98 J. Bukovský, ‘Z Česka odtekly dividendy za více než čtvrt bilionu’, e15.cz, 15 March 2018, htt-
ps://www.e15.cz/domaci/z-ceska-odtekly-dividendy-za-vice-nez-ctvrt-bilionu-1344194, 
‘Čtvrtletní sektorové účty – 4. čtvrtletí 2017’, ČSÚ, 3 April 2018, www.czso.cz/csu/czso/cri/ct-
vrtletni-sektorove-ucty-4-ctvrtleti-2017 and HDP 2019, vývoj hdp v ČR – 5 let, Kurzy.cz, kur-
zy.cz/makroekonomika/hdp/.
99 Ibid.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
50
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
19
(27%), and the energy sector (32%)100. The debate over the outflow of profits has 
been ongoing in the Czech Republic since it joined the EU. This is when taxes 
on the transfer of dividends to parent companies were lifted as part of the im-
plementation of EU laws. Furthermore, partly in an attempt to attract foreign 
investment, the CIT rate was gradually reduced from 45% in 1993 to the present 
level of 19% (this rate has applied since 2010). Unlike with, for example, Esto-
nia, lawmakers did not offer a preferential rate for reinvested profits. Czech 
politicians and economists are increasingly noticing the high degree of de-
pendence on foreign groups101. In turn, the resulting transfers of profits abroad 
expose the economy to the risk of shocks, and restrict the possibilities of trans-
lating the achieved GDP growth into improving residents’ living standards102. 
The dividends, for example, could have been allocated for reinvestments that 
would lead to improving workforce productivity and ultimately also increas-
ing employees’ real wages103. 
The issue of the outflow of profits abroad was also highlighted by the Social 
Democrats in their election campaign in 2017. One year earlier, it also became 
a topic of the report published by the office of the Czech prime minister when 
100 Calculations for the period 2000–2014. Cf. ‘Analýza odlivu zisků: Důsledky pro českou 
ekonomiku a návrhy opatření’, ÚV ČR, 2016, https://www.vlada.cz/assets/evropske-zalezi-
tosti/analyzy-EU/Analyza-odlivu-zisku.pdf. 
101 The ‘foreign groups’ category also includes Czech entrepreneurs who have chosen a differ-
ent country as their principal place of business for tax reasons – for example, the financial 
company Home Credit controlled by the richest Czech, Petr Kellner, is based in Amsterdam.
102 According to a former member of the Bank Board of the Czech National Bank, one of the rea-
sons behind the deterioration of the economic situation in 2008–2013 was the sudden drop in 
the rate of profit reinvestment from around 50% to 25–30% most likely caused by the need to 
recapitalise the foreign central offices of the companies. Cf. T. Pergler, ‘Zahraniční investoři 
odsávají z Česka stovky miliard korun’, Echo24.cz, 2 March 2016, https://echo24.cz/a/wGiv9/
zahranicni-investori-odsavaji-z-ceska-stovky-miliard-korun. 
103 Reinvestments of profits of companies controlled by foreign entities in 2017 reached the lev-
el of 36% of the profits (i.e. 3.0% of GDP), whereas reinvestments in 2016 reached the level of 
28% of the profits (2.3% of GDP). The ratio of the gross national income (GNI, i.e. the money 
remaining in Czech hands) to GDP (the value of goods and services produced in a given terri-
tory regardless of the country of the owner’s headquarters) is also improving. In 2017, it was 
94.4, the highest value since 2005. This is still one of the worst results in Europe (in Poland, 
according to data from the Central Statistical Office, this ratio in 2017 was 96.1). Another fac-
tor which played an important role in the Czech case was the appreciation of the koruna as 
a consequence of ending regular currency interventions, which, for example, made foreign 
investments more appealing to Czech entrepreneurs. Cf. L. Rousek, L. Vainert, ‘Český kapi-
tál nabírá na síle. V kapsách tuzemských podnikatelů zůstalo za loňský rok více peněz než 
dříve’, Hospodářské noviny, 24 April 2018, https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-66119710-cesky-kapital-
nabira-na-sile-penize-do-zeme-rychleji-pritekaji-nez-odtekaji-ukazuji-nejnovejsi-statis-
ticka-data.
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this position was held by the then leader of the ČSSD, Bohuslav Sobotka104. 
It was pointed out in the report that since 2005 the value of the dividends 
transferred abroad exceeded the value of foreign investments (including re-
investments) and was higher than it would have resulted from objective mac-
roeconomic conditions (among the EU member states, the imbalance in this 
area is greater only in the case of countries which are reputed to be tax havens: 
Luxembourg, Cyprus and Ireland). One of the measures to curb this phenom-
enon which was considered at that time was the imposition of taxes on certain 
sectors (for example, the banking sector) – this idea has been rejected for years 
by the current prime minister, Andrej Babiš. During the meeting with the key 
investors in 2018, Babiš showed that, for the time being, he intends to convince 
rather than force them to leave a larger section of their profits in the Czech 
Republic105. The ideas proposed by Babiš include, for example, publishing a list 
of investors who implement large public utility projects. 
5. The minimum wage – the seed of discontent inside 
the government coalition
ANO and the Social Democrats also have different views on pay rises. After 
long debates, the coalition partners have agreed that wages in the public sector 
will be increased on average by around 8%, starting from 2019106. At the same 
time, over 1,300 jobs in the state administration, most of which are vacancies 
anyway due to the shortage of workers, will be liquidated. 
However, the more difficult task for the Social Democrats will be to push through 
the ambitious mechanism of increasing the minimum wage that would make its 
value dependent on the level of wages107. This idea is also backed by employers, 
104 ‘Analýza odlivu zisků…’, op. cit.
105 Cf. K. Surmanová, ‘Nechte zisky v Česku, žádá Babiš investory’, Lidovky.cz, 13 September 
2018, https://www.lidovky.cz/nechte-zisky-v-cesku-zada-babis-investory-fg2-/noviny.
aspx?c=A180912_212243_ln_noviny_ele&. 
106 The group whose wages will grow most of all will be employees of the prosecution authori-
ties (15.9%), while those whose wages will grow to the least extent will include, for example, 
military personnel (7.4%).
107 The minimum wage was increased at the beginning of 2018 anyway, from 11,000 to 
12,200 korunas (476 euros), and then to 13,350 korunas (521 euros) in 2019. It is earned by 
around 135,000 people (around 3% of workers). For comparison, the minimum wage in Po-
land in 2018 was 2,100 zlotys (493 euros) and in Slovakia 480 euros. At the same time, the 
average wage in quarter I in 2019 in the Czech Republic was 32,466 korunas (1,267 euros), 
i.e. clearly more than in Poland (1,162 euros) or Slovakia (1,023 euros). It also should be tak-
en into account that these are gross amounts, and labour taxation in Poland (35.6%) is clear-
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who view it as a stabilising instrument. However, the parameters of the mecha-
nism are a problem. The ČSSD’s goal is to gradually increase the minimum wage 
to 50% of what the average wage was two years ago(beginning from 44% in Janu-
ary 2020 benchmarked against 2018). ANO and employers reject this idea fear-
ing that in the case of an economic slump they will have to pay minimum wages 
on a level seen during the economic boom. Therefore, they want it to be bench-
marked against the forecast of the Ministry of Finance for a given year. 
ANO and employers would also readily support the introduction of a mecha-
nism that would ensure predictability of the minimum wage calculation. In 
their opinion, the optimal value is 40%, ideally indexed to the median wage. 
However, a minimum wage equivalent to 40% of the average wage (which was 
already an objective for the preceding government led by Sobotka) is no longer 
enough for the trade unions – this goal has already been achieved in 2019 (41.1% 
in quarter I), and the situation on the labour market offers them a strong ne-
gotiating position108. The political left is also using the argument that a per-
son who currently receives a minimum wage will not even reach the poverty 
threshold (calculated for a single person’s household) – the net wage will fall of 
the equivalent of almost 30 euros short of the threshold109. 
According to recommendations from the World Bank and the International La-
bour Organization (among other institutions) the optimal minimum wage lev-
el is 30–40% of the median wage, and the upper limit of this range has already 
been exceeded (44% in quarter III of 2018 and over 48% in quarter I of 2019)110. 
ly lower than in the Czech Republic (43.4%) and Slovakia (41.6%). However, it also should be 
taken into account that these data (cf. data.oecd.org/tax/tax-wedge.htm) concern an aver-
age childless worker; in the case of a worker with two children, the taxation is reduced to 
a level of around 27%, and such a big difference as compared to the childless worker’s labour 
taxation is unseen elsewhere in the OECD (cf. David Klimeš, Jak probudit…, op.cit, page 41). 
At the same time, significant differences in the level of contributions paid in the case of em-
ployment contracts and by self-employed people means that the percentage of entrepreneurs 
in the total number of professionally active people is one of the highest in the EU (17.5%, ac-
cording to the World Bank; but lower than in Greece, Romania, Italy, Poland and Portugal). 
Cf. ‘Self-employed, total (% of total employment) (modelled ILO estimate)’, World Bank, April 
2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP.SELF.ZS?year_high_desc=true.
108 For comparison, the minimum wage in Poland in quarter I of 2019 was equivalent to 45.4% 
of the average wage, and in Slovakia this ratio was 50.8%.
109 ‘Příjmová chudoba ohrožuje 9,1 % Čechů’, ČSÚ, 10 April 2018, https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/
prijmova-chudoba-ohrozuje-91-cechu.
110 Cf. T. Mynářová, ‘Očima ekonomů: Hranice pro minimální mzdu? Neexistuje’, Penize.cz, 
3 January 2017, https://www.penize.cz/mzda-a-plat/319207-ocima-ekonomu-hranice-pro-
minimalni-mzdu-neexistuje. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
53
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
19
It can be expected that it will take a long time to discuss this issue during the 
meetings of the trilateral commission. At the beginning of 2019, the minimum 
wage was increased by the equivalent of around 45 euros (the second largest 
increase in history), which was viewed as a defeat by employers and as a suc-
cess by the trade unions and the ČSSD111. However, it is unlikely that there will 
be a compromise regarding a constant mechanism for determining the mini-
mum wage. 
111 For a long time the employers would not accept an increase higher than around 35 euros, 
and the prime minister assured them that the minimum wage rise will not be higher than 
around 40 euros. For comparison, the minimum wage in Poland in 2019 was increased 
by 35 euros and in Slovakia by 40 euros. For more on the employers’ stance see: M. Diro, 
‘Dalším zvýšením minimální mzdy jste opět vyhověli odborářům, napsal dnes prezident 
Hospodářské komory předsedovi vlády. Žádá o vstřícný krok i vůči podnikatelům’, HK ČR, 
19 November 2018, https://www.komora.cz/tiskova_zprava/dalsim-zvysenim-minimalni-
mzdy-jste-opet-vyhoveli-odborarum-napsal-dnes-prezident-hospodarske-komory-predse-
dovi-vlady-zada-o-vstricny-krok-i-vuci-podnikatelum/.
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IV. possIble deVelopmenTs
In the coming years, the Czech Republic will gradually replace its economic mod-
el based on relatively cheap jobs to one with more technologically advanced and 
automated production. This will lead to workforce productivity improving, thus 
enabling companies to gain funds for further pay rises, while reducing employ-
ment. However, this will not always be a painless process. In those cases where 
profitability turns out to be insufficient and increasing added value is impossible 
or too expensive, this may mean winding up production plants and firing em-
ployees. However, if some companies move abroad because the Czech Republic 
becomes increasingly less cost competitive for them, other employers will find 
this helpful because much needed workforce will be released.
The automation of production, which is already underway, will doubtlessly 
pose a challenge to the labour market. Capital investment is natural in a situa-
tion where labour costs are growing112 compared to capital value. Furthermore, 
investing in processes that are less dependent on labour is often the only so-
lution in the case of an insufficient supply of new workers – both immigrant 
workers and local school graduates113. Automation will in the first place liqui-
date jobs which require the lowest levels of creativity. According to the OECD’s 
report, every tenth job in the Czech Republic is at ‘high risk’ of being auto-
mated within 10–20 years, and a further 36% will most likely be significantly 
transformed. However, these figures are higher in the case of the lowest-paid 
occupations114. 
112 According to the results of surveys conducted by the Chamber of Commerce which were pub-
lished in autumn 2018, the increasing labour cost outpaced the workforce shortage in the 
ranking of employers’ greatest problems (this issue fell to a lower place on the list after three 
years). Cf. ‘Odbory žádají růst mezd ve firmách okolo osmi procent. Chtějí i pětitýdenní dovo-
lenou v zákoně’, ČT24, 11 September 2018, https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/ekonomika/2591140-
odbory-budou-tlacit-aby-bylo-pet-tydnu-dovolene-dano-zakonem and ‘Firmy dusí ne-
dostatek lidí, příští rok jich bude chybět půl milionu. Ekonomika kvůli tomu výrazně 
zpomalí, varuje Hospodářská komora’, Hospodářské noviny, 15 October 2018, https://byznys.
ihned.cz/c1-66290980-v-cesku-chybi-440-tisic-zamestnancu-podniky-to-uz-ani-nehlasi-
uradu-prace-podle-hospodarske-komory-lidi-odcerpava-stat-a-nemecko.
113 When the Czech economy was rapidly developing in 2005–2008, around 130,000 new work-
ers were supplied to the labour market annually. At present, this number is around 90,000. 
Cf. J. Macháček, ‘Lék na nedostatek pracovní síly? Migrace’, Česká pozice, 6 September 2018, 
http://ceskapozice.lidovky.cz/debata-jana-machacka-lek-na-nedostatek-pracovni-sily-mig-
race-pq1-/debata-jana-machacka.aspx?c=A180906_101742_machackova-debata_houd#utm_
source=email&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=lidovky.directmail.
114 In the case of Poland, 7% of jobs are at ‘high automation risk’. The largest percentage of jobs at 
risk of automation among the EU member states has been identified in Germany, Austria and 
Spain – 12% each. Cf. also M. Arntz, T. Gregory and U. Zierahn (2016), ‘The Risk of Automation 
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One example of the scale of automation is provided by the number of multi-
function industrial robots per 10,000 employees. In these terms, the Czech 
Republic (119 robots per 10,000 employees) is more advanced than, for exam-
ple, Poland (36), but in 2017 it was still far behind the global leaders (South 
Korea 710, Singapore 658, and Germany 322). Furthermore, it was ranked 
lower than the region’s leader, Slovakia (151)115. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Czech firms’ investments linked to automation and digitalisation in 2017 
increased by 5% y/y, which translated into the largest number of robots sold 
in the region (2,900 items)116. The Chamber of Commerce expected a further 
acceleration of such investments in 2018 as well – to 6%117. Paradoxically, this 
process has been slowed down by the workforce shortage in both the Czech 
Republic and the region as a whole, since this causes delays in the supplies of 
new machines and the introduction of new technologies. In turn, the rapid 
increase in wages has reduced funds for investment. This should be somewhat 
alleviated by the higher demand for labour among larger firms whose invest-
ment budget is as a rule higher, and thus enable investments in substituting 
labour with robots118. Regardless, this signifies that the Czech Republic will 
soon stop competing on the cost of labour, which has been one of its key com-
petitive advantages for a long time. 
Given the limitations (technological and cost-related) of automation and com-
panies’ urgent needs, the best solution may be to improve access for employ-
ees from third countries to the Czech labour market. However, there is public 
resistance to the influx of foreigners, so the related potential political costs 
will most likely mean that – even if the Czech government adopts regulations 
for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis’, OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working Papers, no. 189, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlz9h56dvq7-en. 
115 Data from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) for 2017, ifr.org/downloads/
press2018/Executive_Summary_WR_2018_Industrial_Robots.pdf and rp.pl/CYFROWA-
Technologie/312139875-Marsz-robotow-przyspieszyl-ale-i-tak-tracimy-dystans-do-Euro-
py.html. 
116 Ibid.
117 ‘Kvůli rekordnímu…’, op. cit.
118 The employment outlook survey, i.e. net employment forecast (i.e. the difference expressed 
in percentage between the number of employers declaring an increase and those predict-
ing a decrease in employment in the coming quarter), for quarter II of 2019 for companies 
employing over 250 people in the Czech Republic is 27%. In the case of small and medium-
sized companies (10–249 employees) it is 9%. In the case of micro firms (up to 9 employees) 
it is 2%. The general net employment rate for the Czech Republic is, however, smaller than 
in Poland for example (9%). Cf. ‘Manpower index trhu práce Q2 2019’, ManpowerGroup Česká 
republika, 12 March 2019, https://www.manpowergroup.cz/pruzkumy/manpower-index-
trhu-prace-q2-2019/. 
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liberalising access to the local labour market – these will most likely be insuf-
ficient and passed too late from the viewpoint of the development of the Czech 
economy. The economic crisis in 2009 showed that immigrant workers may 
offer the Czech economy a ‘safety valve’ by strengthening workforce resources 
at a time of increased demand for labour and leaving the country when the 
demand significantly drops off (only 30,000 of 70,000 Ukrainian immigrant 
workers remained in the Czech Republic through the next years of crisis)119. 
Meanwhile, it is very likely that immigrant workers will still be needed in the 
Czech Republic, regardless of the increasing automation. As Czechs’ living 
standards improve, they are becoming increasingly unwilling to take jobs as-
sociated with low social prestige. 
A greater openness to an influx of labour from other countries may also be 
necessary due to the process of an ageing society; the Czech Republic is one 
of the countries where this process is the fastest in Europe. The demographic 
burden rate (the ratio of pensioners to individuals of working age) is expected 
to grow there within 40 years from the present level of 28% to 56%120. Unless 
there is a rapid increase in workforce productivity, this poses a great challenge 
to the Czech labour market. Even though the Czech Republic has continuously 
had a migration surplus since 2014, it is not large (16,000–28,000 individuals 
annually)121, and the demographic structure means that each year the number 
of individuals retiring is 30,000–40,000 higher than the number of people en-
tering the labour market122.
The changes in the investment incentive system announced in the governmen-
tal agenda will most likely already come into force in 2019123: It will depriori-
tise benefits for firms creating low-paid jobs and replace this with attracting 
firms ready to create and develop modern technologies. Time will tell whether 
Czechs succeed at this. However, it is certain that in the present situation the 
Czech Republic really cannot afford to accept further investments based on the 
use of cheap labour on preferential terms. The next step, after investment ben-
119 Cf. M. Petříček, ‘Pokud chceme vyšší mzdy, musíme být produktivnější, říká průmyslník’, 
iDnes.cz, 7 January 2018, https://ekonomika.idnes.cz/montovna-mzdy-rozhovor-prumysl-
jan-rafaj-fgw-/ekonomika.aspx?c=A180105_374185_ekonomika_rts.
120 ’OECD Economic Surveys: Czech…’, op. cit.
121 Cf. ‘Obyvatelstvo’, ČSÚ, 26 April 2019, https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/obyvatelstvo_lide.
122 J. Pravec, ‘Euro pro nás teď není užitečné. Mít jednotnou měnu kvůli turistům je nesmysl, 
říká Babišův poradce’, Ekonom, no. 22/2018, page 24.
123 Cf. K. Osinová, ‘Investiční pobídky čekají změny’, KPMG Česká republika, 18 April 2018, 
https://danovky.cz/cs/investicni-pobidky-cekaji-zmeny. 
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efits, will most likely be investing more money in the Czech education system 
(the government’s agenda envisages increasing teachers’ wages in 2017–2021 
by 50%) and adjusting the education model to the challenges posed by the so-
called ‘fourth industrial revolution’124 (also known as Industry 4.0, covering 
automation, digitalisation and fast data exchange, etc.). 
The purchase of new technologies does not automatically mean an increase in 
workforce productivity – this will happen when employees are able to use them 
effectively, and this requires adequate skills and employer support. Škoda Auto 
is one of the companies which has run a machine-building secondary technical 
school next to the Czech headquarters of the company since 1927 and is engaged 
in so-called ‘dual education systems’. Rapid technological changes bring about 
the need for lifelong education to become more widespread. Another challenge 
linked to Industry 4.0 is the increasing popularity of remote communication 
and virtual reality technologies that reduce the significance of the geographic 
situation. In effect, the advantages of the Czech Republic resulting from its geo-
graphic proximity to Germany may gradually diminish. 
The labour shortage has for a long time caused the Czech Republic’s economic 
growth to slow. This can be seen very clearly in the case of the automotive in-
dustry: the inter-annual increase in the production of motor vehicles (which 
in 2014–2017 ranged between 10.1% and 14.3%) fell to 1.8% in 2018 and 0.6% in 
the first months of 2019125. In turn, the value of new orders in the Czech au-
tomotive industry, which grew in 2014–2016 from 13.9% to 21.4% y/y, already 
slowed down to 2.9% in 2017, and even fell by 2.9% in the first months of 2018126. 
The observed increase in real wages is especially dangerous for Czech export 
firms, in particular, when combined with the growing value of the Czech ko-
runa against the euro, since these two factors adversely affect their price com-
petitiveness. Since the exchange rate was liberalised by the Czech National 
Bank in April 2017, the Czech currency grew by 7% at its peak (January 2018) 
as compared to the previously protected exchange rate and was the strongest 
against the euro since the end of 2012. On the other hand, a possible economic 
124 Cf. the material ‘Iniciativa Průmysl 4.0’, developed by the Czech Ministry of Industry and 
trade which on 24 August 2016 was adopted by the country’s government, https://www.mpo.
cz/assets/dokumenty/53723/64358/658713/priloha001.pdf. 
125 D. Klimeš, ‘Český autoland po letech růstu dojel na svůj vrchol. Teď zpomaluje, obává se pro-
tekcionismu a vyhlíží elektrobudoucnost’, Ekonom, 12 July 2018.
126 Ibid.
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slowdown worldwide and, in particular, the trade war between the USA and 
the EU, poses a great risk to the economy (and thus also the labour market) 
of the Czech Republic which is strongly reliant on exports127. The tensions be-
tween the EU and US affect the Czech Republic mostly indirectly, as it supplies 
many components to vehicle factories in Western Europe which are then ex-
ported across the Atlantic. The terms of Brexit will be even more important for 
the Czech Republic because the United Kingdom is among the key recipients 
of Czech exports (almost 8 billion euros in 2017 and 2018 each; the fifth largest 
recipient of exports from the Czech Republic)128, in particular cars (in 2017, it 
was the second largest recipient of Czech exports, behind Germany, falling to 
4th place the following year)129. 
All these factors mean that economic growth is expected to slow down: from 
4.4% in 2017 and less than 3% in 2018 to around 2.5% in the next two years130. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the traditionally strong exports, increasing do-
mestic demand will increasingly stimulate the Czech economy over the next 
years. The economic growth will also be supported by investment in reorgan-
ising production processes to increase workforce productivity. Therefore, it is 
expected that the Czech Republic’s GDP growth (which in 2015–2017 was over 
12% in aggregate), will also be significant (around 10%) during the next three 
years, although not so strong as previously. 
The need to curb the accelerating inflation is another reason for the expected 
slowdown. Inflation has been stable at a level of 0.5% for three years, and then 
increased to 2.5% in 2017 and 2.2% in 2018, to a great extent as a consequence of 
the increasing wages. It is not expected to change any time soon; in 2018 nomi-
nal wages grew by 8.1% y/y (5.9% in real terms), and according to the economic 
127 When President Donald Trump was receiving representatives of car companies in the White 
House on 11 May 2018, he said that he was preparing the imposition of 25% import duties on 
some vehicles. According to the European Commission’s analysis, this would cut imports of 
vehicles from the EU to the USA by a half. The meeting of the President of the European Com-
mission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and President Trump calmed down the situation to a certain 
extent, but even then Trump clearly excluded cars from the agreement and did not rule out 
imposing a higher customs duty rate on them in the future, emphasising the imbalance of 
existing rates (US imports from the EU at 2.5% and imports from the USA to the EU at 10%).
128 The United Kingdom further loses in relative importance as a Czech export destination in 
2019. The data for the first four months show the Czech export increase of 2.4% y/y to be the 
lowest among top ten Czech export destinations.
129 Data from the Czech Statistical Office.
130 ‘Makroekonomická predikce’, Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, https://www.mfcr.
cz/cs/verejny-sektor/makroekonomika/makroekonomicka-predikce.
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model of the Chamber of Commerce, in 2019 the wages will grow at a similar 
rate131. Therefore, it should be expected that the central bank, wanting to pro-
tect the inflation target, will continue the policy of gradually raising interest 
rates, especially given the fact that the government’s agenda includes numer-
ous promises of social transfers and pay rises. One side effect of this will be 
rising inflation. 
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131 Cf. ‘Komorová národohospodářská prognóza’, HK ČR, 10 June 2018, https://www.komora.cz/
files/uploads/2018/06/20180610_Komorov%C3%A1-n%C3%A1rodohospod%C3%A1%C5%99s
k%C3%A1-progn%C3%B3za_tabulka.pdf. 
